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CHAPTER I
REALISTIC PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA:

ITS BEGINl!INGS .

DEVELOPMENT, AND DEBT TO WILLIAM

PEPPERELL

Y~NTAGUE

Realietic philoeophy derivee its name from the attitude that it takes toward the validity of our knowledge ot
extra.mental reality.

The history of realism as a philoso-

phical system can be traced back

t?

an~ient

Greeee.

~The

typioal affirmation ot Exaggerated Realism, the most outspoken ••er

m~de,

appears 1n

Pl~to's

pbllosophy •••• Aris-

totle broke away trom these exaggerated views ot his master
and tot"mUlated the main dootrines of Moderate Realism."l
•

Aristotle was the great exponent ot realism in the ancient
world.

.,

Realistic philosophy in the form of moderate realism

attained its greatest expression during the middle agee.
st. Thomas Aquinas was the most important medieval expoilent

of realistic philosophy.
In modern times idealistic philosophy and various forms
of phenomenalism and skepticism became the dominant philosophic outlook in Europe and America.

This skeptiCism ot

80

much ot modern philosophy is contrary to the spirit of modern
eeienee which plays such a dominant role in modern life •

..
1M• De Wulf, "Nominalism, Realism, and Conoeptualism",
ingxc1gpedla (New York, 1913), XI, 91.

Ca~R11,e

1

2

This tailure ot the prevailing philosophies to maintain
contac.t with the experimental sclenoes condemned them in
the eyes at educated people.

Not all philosophers, however,

held aloot trom the philosophical 1mpl1cations of the f1ndings ot the experimental sciences.

"On Its positive and

constructive slde the ph11osophlcal reaction to the new
spirIt of science was the development ot realism -- a development which, In all essentials, took place during the flrst
two decades at the twelfth century."2

,

PrevIous to this date, however, in our country there
were indications of dIssatisfaction with the then dom1nant
1dealism.

.

.

A good example of this trend was the philosophy'
.

ot James McCosh, which maintained that America should d,ve1op
Ita own phllosophy as an expresslon ot ita scientifio spirlt.
He was oonvinoed that this would be best expressed by some
form of realism.

In his book

R!!11'~1c

Fbilos2PbX he bad

this to say about realism and about the favorable condltions
for this philosophy in our country'
.

;

2Wi11 Iam Hen~ WerkmeIster, A Hlst~ s! Fhl1o§2ROI9!1
Ideal in Ame£~la (New York, 1949), P. '7 •

If a. genuine American philosopry a.rises, it ~nust reflect the genius of the people •••• if tl'ere is to be
an A:ner1oan philosophy, 1t must be realistic •••. The
A:nericans believe that trere are tl'ings to be knolom,
to be pr1zed and secured, and will never therefore
look approvlngly on an ar;nostlc1sS1 wh:1cl" declares
that knowledge is unatta1nable. Tt-e Amerioan philosophy \,1111 tl:erefore be a realism, o-pposed to id~ali6m
on tbe one hand ana to agnostiolsm on tte other.~
In regard to tbe specifio na.ture Of ttls rea11s'll >IcOosh

continues in the following vein:
mind peroeives matter.

"Realls:n holds that the

In sense perception we know things;

we know them &s external to tt.e perceivlng self--as extended
and exeroising resisting power."4

Tte first organized

op~osition

"
to tbe idealist monop-

oly in Amerioan philosophy oa119 fro:n the pragmatists.

It',

•

was William James and John Dewey in particular who critioized
of.

weak points in the idealist posit.ion.

James attaoked the

idealist notion of oonsciousness in an article in the
nal 2! Fhiloso'Ohy.

~

In referenoe to consoiousness he said

"Tbat entity is fictitious, while thougbts in tre ooncrete
are fully real lt .5
'James (,'1COosh, 3tH1•• i'ti.1I :fbllQsophy vol ~I (New York.
1887), p. 4.
4~.; P .. 5
5William James, t'Does 'Oonsciousness t EXUlt", Journal 2!:
Fbilosophl, I (September, 1904), p. 491. In the following
references to tre J2urnal .sa! Philo§optx the abbrev1ation i£
will be used.

4
Another notable philosopher or thIs early period or
realism was Francia Ellingwood Abbot.

He proposed a real-

ism based on biological notions to Which he gave the name
"scientific" rea11sm.

He was aoutely oonscious of the need

for a reform in the dominant philosophical thought ot the
times.

He tore-shadowed the neo-realist movement 1n his

insistence on a new method in approac?ing philosophical
problems.

In reterence to this needed philosophical re-

farm Abbot saysl

Vrbat is this needed philosophical refoPm?Brietly,
to substitute the scientific method in ~hil08oP~'
is tne ori1y poiiIO!e means, In tfi!s e:ri Ioa1 an
soeptical age, ot making ethics and religion so reasonable as to command the oontinued allegianoe ot reasonable minds •••• Unso lent itio philosophy oonoeivctuJ the
universe as nothing but a Thought-world, and 1n this
oonoeption there Is no room for any Meohanical Re~l.
On the possibility of developing a scientitio phIlosophy out ot the scientifio method itself must depend
at last the only possibility, tor reasonable men, of
believing equally in the real prinoiples ot ethioal
soience. Today the greatest obstacle to such a peasonable beliet is the ·philosophioal idealism" Whioh directly oontradicts it; and the greatest reta.rm n&eded
in modern thought ••• is the substitution ot the soientitic method tor the idealistic method in philosophy
Itself.o

~ano1a Ellingwood Abbot; A Publio A~peal for Redress
to the Cor2oration and Overseers-or Miivar ~n!veFiit{1 (BOSron;-r~I),
T~8ame ItPe8s11 maIntained even 0 this
day by naturalistio philosophers on the need tor the use of
the scientifio method in philosophy as the only alternative
to idealism.

p.a,.

5
The realism that Abbot proposed is very insistent on
man t s abi Ii t,}' to know the object of knowledge.

"Episte_

mology is obviously impossible, unless tbe object of know-

ledge 1s knowable: Knowable as it Is, not as it is not -Knowable (more or less) as it is both in Itself and out
of itself, that is, In both its intern~l and external re-

lations, without whlot there wou1d be npthing to know. tt7

Abbotfs attempt to develop a realistic approacr to
knowledge in phllosophy was in keeping with the spirit of
the physical seienoes.
The growing oonviction among educated people of tre

.

value of 1.1:"'e scientific method and of its possible appl~- ..
'

cation in fields ot.ter than tte physical scisl1ces must

~ot

be under-estimated a.s an importa.nt fa.ctor In tre development of rea,listie prilosophy.

For the fru1t of appl1ed

science as seen In the development of teohnolo[!y and the
growth of industriallza.Lion was very eVident in the United
Sta.tes.
Progress in tre sciences and tte consequent comforts
and conveniences that tria brougtt to everyday lif::; made
7Francls Ellingwood Abbot, The §Xlloglstlc Philosoph!,
vol. II (Boston, 1906), P. i48

6
the majority of people aware of the value of applied scienoe
in tteir everyday life.

In educated oiroles the scient1fiC:

method oame to be looked upon a8 tr:'e key to progress 1n all
scholarly endeavour.
It was in this

at~osphere

of confidence in the ability

of man to master his material environ,nent ttat tte first
organized attempt was made to formulate a scientific real•

ism.

It was in 1910 ttat six

re~-llists

formed an alliance

for the purpose of developing a realistic epistemology that,
would stand up agaInst the objectIons of the !dealists.
Tbis gro:lp was composed of Ferry and Holt fro-n Harvard,
Marvin and Spaulding froll Prjnoeton, and Pitkin and :,lonta":'
£UG

from ColLlmaia.

•

Their Bet purpose was to uee tle' sctenof,

tific ,netrod in tte ir appr'oach t.o

th~

;,Jroble :ns of pt:ilosophy.

They re9.sonea that wct- of the progress in tl's physical and
b1010gical sciences was due to tre faot that scientists
worked togetber, pooled treir knowledge, and c,;nfined the:;i'"
selves to one single problem.

They wished to apply this

method to U-'6 stud,' of tre;>roble:ns of phl1o,sod,y.

In par-

tioular trey confined the :nse Ives to tre fie 1d of epistemology and to t'be specific proble '-(1 of the knowing prooess.

7
In this ",:ray they felt treat they would coone to a oertain oonclusion, and thus obtain definite results. 8 Tra1r working
procedure is clearly set forth in the beginnin[ of their
Pla.tform in tr:€ following manne!':
It 1s tberefore witt: the ho-;,}e ttat by cooperatlon
genuine proble:ns will be revealed, philosoprical t
thouFtt "fill be olarified., and a way opened for
real progress t that the undersigned bave co~ne together, deliberated, and endeavored to react an
agree:nent. Suot cooperatiqn bas t.!Jree fairly distinct, thougr not necess8.rily successive stages:
first it seeks a state:nent of funda'nental principles and doctrines; secondly, it aims at a progra:n
of constructive work following a llett'od founded on
these prinCiples and doctrines; finally ft endeavors
to obtain a. syste:n ofaxio,TIS, mettods, hypotheses,
and facts, wrich r8.ve been so arrived at and formule.ted, that at least those investigator, wbo l';ave
,
coo~erated can aooept the ~J1 as a whole.~

f

.
Thjes

state~11ent

of purpose or

platror~

..

was eet fort,r in
...

the first cooperative work of this group, whlcr was an article 1(1 tre July 1910 issue of the Journal

.2.! Pb1 10 t:}opr;y: ,

?§lcholofY ~ Soientific :I;'etbod§ entitled "A l'rograrn and
Platfor!'!'! of Six Realists" .10

Two years later trey pub]lsr;ed

the results of the II' JOint researches in a ooo.t;)eratlve volume
entitled the

~

Realism.

Tt<is bool{ 1s one ,of the classios

8In tr:e lone run this atte:npt proved to be unsuccessful
not only for the neo-reA,lists. but aleo for tre oritical
realists.
9E.B.Holt et al •.t "The Platform of S1t Real1sts", Ji,
VII iguly, 19l0T.' P.' .,93
- This periodioal became Journal 2! Pbiloso-or;y, Jan., 1921.

1n the stoJ:'>Y of Amorican realism and should be read by
anyone who wishes to have an understanding of the movement that it represented and expressed.
The actual area, ot' agreement or the neo-realists as
expressed in their book vIas not as great as their first
hopes seemed to indicate.

In spite of intensive research

many points of disagreement remained.
realists

exp~essed

In brief the neo-

agreement on two working procedures.

which really had been points of agreement at ,the start of
their cooperative work, and agreement with

~e8ervations.

on three principles of the theory of knmvledge.

The two

working pI'oeedures that they agreed on were to work togEf,ther
as a group sharing their findings v11th one
work on one problem at a time.

another~

..

and to

.

They adopted these two pro-

cedures from the example of the cooperative efforts of the
physical scientists.
In regard to the actual content of their agreement 1n
the matter of epistemology, they agreed that some of the
objects of which we are aware are actually real, and exist
apart from our thinking of or perceiving them.

They had a

problem in regard to Objects of error and illusion.
next area of agreement was in regard to the universal

The

9
notions that we tave of things.
tJ-~ese

They agreed th:lt eo,ne of

at least were true notions in that our idep."s were

based on a

re~l

understanding of particular objects.

Finally, they agreed thnt 80;11e at least of tre things trat
we peroeive and ap-nrehend, we perceive directly by percelvin~-:

the trine; itself in so:ne physical way ratter tha.n

by percei'l inE tt indirectly throu"r:

inage.

SO'Tl:

oopy or mental

Again 1n tris case they rp,d difficulty in explain-

in6 objects of ll1uslon a.nd error .11
always posed. as

p,

The proble'T.! of error

serious one to tr-e neo-rer;\l:fet epist.e-

:nology •

The general progra;) of th! neo-realists indioates U'a.t

•

they 11:nited treir efforts to tte speoific project of deterof.

:.nlning tbe relationshl-p between the knower and the tt'ing

knhwn.

They did not try to a.ehieve unanimity a.s to tre

nature of the thing known.

The entire platform of tre nec-realists is of suet importanee to tr:e development of Americl3.n realls": trf:lt 1t
should be oonsulted 1n full ir! order to ta're a reA-I under-

standing of t'bls movement.

It can be found 1n tYe appendix

11W1l119.11 Feppere 11 ir.ontae;ue, '1:l':;
(New York, 1940), PP. 234-235.

~ .Q.! Tt:higp,

10

of

!h!.

~

. .,R...e...
8 ...
1...
1-.sm
.. or in the 1910 volume of the Journal

2! Philosophl.The principal notion of the platform is that
the objects or entities under study in the various sciences
are fundamentally real in the sense that they either actually exist or could exist given the proper circumstances;

0%'

they- are real at least in the sense that they are principles
of thought that haves foundation 1n reality.
•

Furthermore,

the neo-realists make a distiriction between objects that
ocoupyreal space, and objeots that are purely mental but
are not self contradictory.

The former are "Said to exist,

but the latter are said merely to subsist.
the term subsistent as follows:
siatent' to denominate anz ..2!!!. of
objeots

2!

thourJ:t. nl2

i/;ontague defines

"I shall use the term

.2 actual

~

~$ub-

•
possible

Hence,. anything that is thought about

is said to subsist, and mental existence and subsistence are
identical terma.
The nature or existence of real objects. however, is

in no way affected by their being known.

~1ey

are what

12Wil11am P. Montague at al •• The New Realism.
1925), p. 253. - --

(New York,

11

they are and

~emain

apart fronl it.

such in the act of being known and

The neo.-realists also hold that the degree

of unity among objects and the ha!t!llony in the physical un....
iverse are just as objeotive as the things

thew~elves

and

that the foundation of all relations among objects is in
the objects themael vas.

V;hile admitting that epistemology was not the I"los.t

•
basic science, the nee-realist"s felt that it was not heees"

sary to go any deeper into the study of reality in order to
solve the problem of h"Tlowledge.

T:'ley held that there are

certain principles of human thought that are basic to all
the sciences, but they did not think that the nature of 'the
world oould be inferred from the nature of knowledge.

..

...

At

the samet1me, how.ver, they oonsidered that knowledge was
something that was.just as physical and material as the
object knov.rn.

Indeed lmowledge was looked upon by them as

some sort of neural response to the object known.

The Whole

explanation of the problem of knowledge,wss to be found on
a purely physical and material level.

This 1n general was

the area of a.gl"ee.ment for the neo-reallsts in their study

12

of the epistemological p~oblel'n.l3

13 The principal propositions of the neo-realists and
the1r platform are stated as follows In the Journal of
Phi1osophX'
1

F

..........

The entities under study in logic, mathematics,
and the physioal sciences are nqt mental in the proper sense of that word.
.

1.

The existence and nature of these entities is
in no sense cond1tioned by their being known.

2..

3. The degree ot unity, conSistency, or oonneotion
subsisting among entities is a matter tobs empirically determined.

4..
5.

Epistemology 1s not log1oally fundamental.
There are certain principles of logic whieh ar~

logically prior to all scientific and

systems.

6. The nature of reality cannot be
from the nature of knowledge.

metaphysic~l

inre~red

f

•

mere\y

7. Cognition belongs to the same Y/or1d as its objects.
That 1s both have their place In the order of nature.

8. The objective oontent of consc10usness is any

entity in so far as it 1s responded to by another

ent1ty in a special manner exhibited by the reflex
nervous system.

.i!!,

1,':. P. Montague, et a1 •• "The Platform.of Six Realists",
VII (July, 1910) P'P.'93-401.

13

The Neo-Realist Platform

The platform of the nec-realists represented the greatest cooperative aohievement of this movement.

After this

its greatest cooperative achievement, the neo-realist movement began to deoline as far as its influence on the American philosophieal soene was conoerned.

This decline was

due in part to a failure to'achieve a greater area of agreement, but more particularly to a failUre to give a really
satisfactory answer to the problem of error and hallucination in the workings of the senses.

"The differences
that
,
were most important both in themselves and in their influence

.,

on the later development of the neo-realistic movement oentered first on the question as to the tBehavioristio t .nature
of consciousness and second on the question as to the ".rela-tivistio
existential status
!h! objeots £! illusion
t

~

~

~ error.·~ One sad result of this fa1lure was that oertain neo-realists proposed solutions to these problems that
contradicted the proposed solutions of other neo--realists.
This situation naturally enough caused the neo-realists some
loss of prestige in the eyes of their opponents.

14v111l1am P. Montague,

!h! waye .2!

Things, p.

245.

Tl"ere is also 80,le indioation t.hRt even WrEn: th6 neo-

realists

a.f"~EH1d

Q.;!lOnc the:llselves, trat U'is

not entirely due to tl"-elr

propositlr)I1s.

;~~::nta.sue

co~plete

A.~rae"nent

was

aoceptance of one another' t s

bad U'is to sa,:; conoernJns ttelr 00-

o;)era.tlve efrorts and their efforts to re8.or c.,:n'TIon ag1'ee-

::nent.

"Vie rea.c one anoUerts

:noet, part;lAke

pa::H~rs, and we did

tor U-.

the revislons or at leasj:, tte ollm1eeicns ttat

were requested, but I a;n afraid tra.t especially en llatters
about wh1c1" we felt strongly th!re tended to develop amollS
us a t~tc1t and, I ho.?. a.n unc()naclous underet~andlng whlcb
1.f made expllci t cou Id rave been expressed a.s t ·1 t 11 pa.ss
YO'..lr stuff 1f you w111 pass mine t

."lS

.
f

Tl"':ere re:.na.lrled always. bowever, one basIc

•

proPos1t~on

to wrlcr all tre neo-rsr:tl1sts Agreed, and wric\" really con ...
stItuted tr'!? vi?,ry core a.nd founda.tlon of tte reallstnove-

ment.

-It

C(~ns18ted

1n ttc a~,tempt to

BrOW by

e'nplrlcal

exa:nir:atlon a.nd inference t'bat the ti"ince trat are believed

to be rea.l do not 8ee:':1 to depend on tre f1:l,ct th!"l.t tt:ey can

f1eure

8S

objects or perce"tual and conceptu~l experlence. n16

15~l:;ntagu., P. 234.
16Wl11la. -n 1'. >!;)nt.a.gue, Conte:nograr i ;ner1 a
ed. by George p. Ada.1S and William it. ?ontf*.gua ~

1925), PP. 153-154.

15
The neo-realists always held fast to this their basic
proposition ttat reality existed apart trom our knowledge
of it, and that our knowledge added nothing to the scope
of the external world.

Tt6 neo-realists were able to give

a good explanation of our dependence upon the external world
for our knowledge, but they were weak in tr,e ir explanation
of error.

The neo-realists held that we know objects di-

rectly by being phys10ally influenoed by

the~.

This posi-

tion made it very diffioult to explain error, because it
called for the extra.mental existence of objeots of illueion and error.

11:;e neo-realist explanat10ns of error were

.

never wholly satisfaotory to some realist phllosoprers.
80me

f

•
of these 'ph1losophers formed an s,ssooi& tion to correct
...

tre errors of tt-e neo-realists.

This group came to be call-

ed the oritioal rea11sts, because they insisted upon a reexamina.tion of t l"e foundations of realism.
The R'~6 of Critioal Realism
The critical rea.lists represent the next st.ep in the
development of American realism.

Tre years

~etween

1916.

1920 were the formative ones for critical realism. Seven
men were c p1efly responsible for this ~ovement. They were

16

Drake, Lovejoy, Pratt, Rogers, Sellars, Santayana, and
strong.

The results of Uelr findings they incorporated

in their book

~s,aYI

In

Qri~igal

5eallsm.

The critical

realists, like their neo-rea1ist predecessors, understood
tbe value of cooperative effort, and limited tre1r area of
a.greement to the :natter of epistemology.

They atated treir

limited agreement as follows 1n the preface of their cooperative book.

"It should

'De

added, however, trat no agree-

ment ha.s been sought except on tre epistemologlca.l problem •••
the members of our group hold somewhat different ontological
views."17

.

The chief criticism that the critical rea11sts had"of
tre neo-rea1ists was concerning their treatment
lem of error.

o~

'

the prob...

The neo-rea1iets, beoause they held to a pre-

sentative rather tban a representJative theory of perception,
lett no rooJ] for

sub.~ective

tlilal error or illusion.

factors as tte cause of percep-

A olassical example of perceptual

error or illusion is how rai1roa.d tracks
when viewed fro'l1 the rear observation

c~.r

see~

to converge

of a train.

We

know fro'] experience, however, that the ra.ils do not actually converge.

Tte nea-realist, nevertreless, because of

17Durant Drake !1 al., Eisaxa in Oritioal Realilm,
(New York, 1920), P. vii.

17
his theory of

p~roeption

would have to hold that in re-

lation to the viewer tbat the traoks did oonverge. 18
This position is obviously open to severe critiois i, from
~any

day

quarters, because it contradicts tre facts of everyexperience.
1'1':e positive contribution of the critical realists to

an expla.na.tion of the knowing, process was tt'e €llphasis t'bat
they gave to subjective factors in treir epistemology.

T'be

majority of oritical realists, because or the subjective
A

factors in their epistemology, beld to epistemological dualism as the only possible way of avoiding the mistakes of the
,

neo.realists.

"Tre dualistic ••• view maintains tbat oon-

sciousness and the world of physioal objects in space

•

f

a~e

essentially different trom eaoh other in kind; and ttat the
psychioal may be defined as consisting ofnon-physioal enti ties whioh. tho ,:gh they may be 1IRa;t1a.1, are not in spaoe J
and which exist only as functions of one or .Dore individual
persons or organiems •••• But although the dualist insists
that our knowledge of' the pbysical 'IOrld is mediate, be is
very far fro'11 oonsidering it unreal •••• our ideas

far from

18Willia:n F. ~Jlonta.guef The \faye 2t Thingg, PP. 247-252.

18
forming our prison house, are in fact our means of knowing t1-:e outer world:'19

:Pratt in defending tre necessity

of a dualistic position made a radical distinction between

tre object of ltnowledge and our ideas about tte object.
However, he

~ade

bott factors material.

Roy Wood Sellars, anotrer critiOal realist, has tti8

.

to say a:..out knowledge of external objects throuSf: the content of perception:
Tre situation is, of course, unique, and metaphors
will not much help us. The knower is confined to
the datum, and can never literally insI'ect the existent whicb he a.ffirms and claims to know. Penetrative 1ntu1tion of the physical world is impossible just because we humans are wr,at we are, organisms
stimulated by external things. Knowledge rests upd.n
tre use of data. as revela.tions of objects becausEVof
wrat may, I think, be rlertly called a logical identity between them •••• Fhysica.l objects are the objects
of knowledge t though tt ey can be known only in terms
of the d~ta whicr they control within us. 20
The oritical reali8ts held to a represebtative theory
of knowledge by means of wl::lcr trey hoped to give a satisfaotory account of error and 1llusion.

They held that we

do not know objeots directly as tt1ey are in themselves. but
that we d1reotly only know the idea or mental image or

ism:'

t~e

19James Bissett Pratt, HA Defense or Dualistic RealXIV (May, 1917), p. 253.
2°Durant Drake !1 !l., icsaye in Critical Realism, p.203.

~
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objeot.

They insisted, however. that we know tte obJeot

by meane of the mental 1mage or sense datum that we have in
our mind of the objeot.

Tbe sense datum is the result of

the influenoe of the object on the brain througr the ssnses,
and of tte role of the senses a.nd the brain 1n produoing an
image of the object in our consciousness.

The 1nfluence of

the objeot on the senses is somethin&physical to the oritioal realists, a.nd the aense datum that results from the inter.
a.ction of tte knower and t'he object is itself physical •
•
As the oontroversies between tte oritioal realists and
the neo-realists oontinued it became more evident tbat the

.

explanation of the nature and funotion of oonsoiousness was
the ohief point of dissention between them.

The

•

SUOC~SB

of

coth groi.lps in explaining the nature of kr:.owledge had only
been partial.

The neo-realists had no problem with their

explanation of the objeotivity of knowledge, beoause tbere
was no subjeotive faotor in their theory intervening between
the knower and the ObjBCt known.

However, they could not

give a satisfactory explanation of error and haJlucination,
because they he ld
obJect.

~J"

at every experienoed object was

tit

real

This meant that tr'e objects of error and halluci-

20

nation existed in tre external universe.

Tb:1s POsi7"ion

:nakes it impossible to distinguish true perception from
false perception.

Indeed on tte faoe of it trere should

not be suct a thing as a false perception, if every experienced object is a real object. 21 This conclusion is so at
varianoe with experience, that tte burden of proof rests with
those who bold such a view.

The neo-realists were never

able to Sive a fully satisfactory explanation of error and
illusion.
The critical realists as "epistemologi~al dua1ists"
were able to give a good explanation of hallucinations, delusions, f:tnd errors of sense perceotion.

Yet they

ha~

•

difficulty in explailline: the objeotivity of knowledge..
yana,

8.

.

much
Santa-

ori tioal realist t understood the problem tt at the

oritical realists faced here, but he seemingly felt that no
rational a,newer couJd be found for it.

At least

tha;~

impresaionttat must be gathered from the following

is the

state~ent.

"Knowledge ••• is belieft belief in a. world of events, and es ....
peclally of trose parts of it wrich a.re near the self. tempting or threa.tening it.
2lWilliam ?

Tria belief is native to anima.ls,

Hontague, ~ WJl..Qf Knowing, pp. 292-297.

21

and precedes all deliberate use of intuitions as signs and
descriptions of things •••• The truth whioh discourse can
aohieve is truth in 1ts own terms, appropriate descript10na
it 1s no 1noorporation or reproduction of the object in the
m1nd. tt22

In th1s description of the prooess of knowledge

the basis for any conformity that m1ght exist between the
mind and its object is belief.

Certainly belief is a poor

foundation for a philosophical- system.
,

The obvious d1fficulty in the critical realist view i8

that sinoe we only direotly know the eense-data, how can we
be sure that the sense-data corresponds to the external objeot?

For there is no way of' ohecking the sense-data wi.tb
,

the obJeot.

The beet that the oritical realist oan ad 1s to

presume that the sense.data is like the obJeot.

"-

However, a

presumption is a weak basis tor a philosophical system, and
likeness to the object rather than identity with it is a
poor understanding of the nature

or

knowledge.

Each side was always quiok to aee the weak point in the
arguments of their opponents.

Lovejoy, a oritical realist,

22Georse Santayana, §oePbigltm ang Aniwal FaiMb.
(New York. 1923), P. 179.

22
had this to say of neo-realisml

"Neo-realism, when consis.

-

tent, seemingly means ·pan-obJeotivism'.

If consciousness

1s but a.n external relation, not even the content. of' an
f

erroneous' presentation

must

be

OEm

exist merely subject1vely.

a.s lrldependent· and objective.

as

It

everytrclng else,

whicr means amont:: otrer things, that it must find a place
in real spaoe."23

The arguments of Lovejoy against the n80-

realis't conoeption of error were always effective. 24
Montague, a neo-realist with reaervati9ns, pointed out
that the oritical realists witt all their concern for an explanation of error were not able to explain satlsfactort l y
our knowledge of

ex~ei-nal

objeots.

"Oritical Rea11sm.has
~

revived an old puzzle ratter,('han contribut'ed a new s~lution
of it, ano ttat in its eagerness to

~re§eryi'

the

~

between

the undisciplined hordes of mutually Inoo:npatible ideas and
the single self consistent syete:n of univalent mater1al entities it ha.s made that gap as hopelessly unbridgeable as it
was in t~e ea.rlier dualistic realisms ot Locks and Desoartss. 25
23Artfb1,}t".; 0 .~,LOtreJo1, "Error and the New Realism u • thllgeophical Revi8,." XXII (May, 1913). p. 41.
24william p. Montague, The Way s !21 Things, p. 253.
25~b1d., p. 259.
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The diffiou1ty remains inesoapable as long as crItical
•
realism mainta.ins Its ra.dioal eplste,nollg1oal dualls:3.
The General Tendencies of
Realism
'1': e failure

or

C~:mte::lpOr?lry

bott, tre neo-realists an(

tt~

oritica.l

real1sts to aat1'sfactorl1y axpla'in th! knower-object rell3..
tionehlp cnco'"lraged t1"e rise

or

e. tl"1.;rd grou;,'

':)1' American

realists, who oan be oa114d t"'e oonte"llporary re9.1ists 'beoause trey are active a.t tl-e

'~"'lre8ent

tIme.

Like trair pre ..

deoeseors they formed an a.ssocia.tion for th3 purpose of ad-

va.ncing the progr8sa of realistio phl1oeopry, a.nd oalled
ther.1selves tr·e Association for RealIstIc Fh~.loeophy •. T!"la
group 'drew

U';J

a pla.tform of th€ ir own

a.rJd put 1 t

.'

t~ogetrer

witl" tl:'eir own e01'1trlbutlo:'s t!J tl-'e move:nent, in a book
called

ru

Rgt.yrn It,o Blasen.

Jorn 'dild wa.s th:J ed1 (~or ot

this work, ':.:ut thIrteen ot""'ere 118.de c rmtr1buU. (')ns to H .• 26

26Tre e'mtributore to the 'book in addition to John D.
Wild were John ladd. Robert Jordan. Harry S. Broudy, J.
Arttur >1a!'t~n, Ct:arles Y':s11k, Harmoc !.:. Cl"a.pman, Oliver
,Mart1n, JaEse DeBoer, lilianley H. Thom9aon. Jr., Franci.
H. i'R.rker, Penry Veater f £11 seo Vi va.s ana W111113.:'1 A.

Banner.

This book

!h!

Return

12

Reason, was reminisoent of

!h! !!! Realism of the neo-realists, and Essays
Realism

of

the oritioal

~eallsts

~

Critical

as a oonolse statement of

the purpose and procedure of the contemporary realistio movement.

John Wild expressed this notion of the book as follows:

"This book is the fruit of a co.operstive movement known as

.

the Association far Reallstlc, Philosophy, whloh bas now been
in existenoe for fl va years •••·.Several of the c ontrlbutors
partioipated In the formulation of the platform.
familiar with it.
certain statements.

All are

Many of us would disagree- in interpreting
But all of us accept the platform in

the sense in which it was formulated, as a program far

'~riti-

cal clarification and defense •• n27
"-

These contemporary realists hold the position that we
kno\"1 extramental reality, and that we know it as it actually
is.

Wild states this position as follows:

"Realistio phiio-

sophy, as we understand it, is radioally empirical in the
sense that its basic oonoepts and prinoiples are derived from
observation and analysis of the immediately given data of experience •••• The world 1s constituted by a plurality of active,

27John D. Wild !i !I-I
1953>, p. v.

!h!

Return !2 Reason, (Chicago,
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existent entities which are really related to one another,
without being absorbed in a monistic absolute •••• Realism
also defends the thesis that these actual entities can be
known by the human mind, at least in part, as they actually
are.,,28
Unlike their predecessors among the American realists,
the contemporary realIsts extend their cooperation and agreement to all the branches of .philosophy.

They give as much

consideration to metaphysics as they do to epistemology.
They assert that ,it is necessary to agree on'the basic principles of ontology .in order to reach agreement in the field
of epistemology because a true understanding of the

nat~e

• the
of being 1s presupposed in any.serious consideration of
nature of our knowledge of that being or reality_
In reference to our.awareness of the objects of reality,
the contemporary realists maintain that liThe most primitive
fact of any act of awareness as it presents itself to our inspirat ion. is the fact that

II !! always 2!. somethlns other

lh!!!. itself. ,,29 Thus the real exi.tenoe of an object of
28ibid., pp. vi-vii.

29.!.!2!S..,

p.

153.
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knowledge 1. presuppOsed in this eplat.emoloQ'..

or

studies the nature
dOeS not create it.

knowl.edge.

E;plstemoloQ

It finds lteobject, 1t

This 1s the bs.a1c proposit1on or all

realistic philosophy.
':"'he contemporary

r~a.118t.s

hol.d thr:-.t oolnr:-: oannot. be

reducod to just matter, but that ·the

Nl!I~l

world are hOUl material and l::tlJlaterial.

the truth ot this proposition Can be

oal eVidence.

Tl-:ey mablta1n tha.t

e.tablle~ed by

empiri.

The real world and the obJeot. tha. tare 1n it

can be known d.ireotly by the human mind.

tl:lngs themselves and not Just

thIngs.

entit.ies in the

SOtl8

The mind knows the

mentAl 1mage

or

the

Tbe relat10ns that exist among the obJeots in

t~•

• the
world are real in the sanae that tbelr foundation Is in
of.

tl-::.ings themselves.

The tr.1nd disoovers tbis relationsh1p,

it does not create it..
olua1.:>!'l.s

The mind. a.lso Qan draw Qlllrtutn oon-

t!:e fa.ota ot observatton thc1- t can be

fro~!l

principles for guidance in the matter at hand.

t!8Bd

as

From a con-

sideration of human nature certa.1n prlncl;cles ca.n be esta.b11&1;.3:1 in the ethical ordor that are Just as va11d in that

oreier as tba

i~ri.nolplc8

valid in thl order

or

estab11s1-:!(;C!. for t.'be sOiene's are

phlalcal natuN.

The oontempom17

rea11sto in tlle!r searoh tor trutr g1ve full oons1deration

to the perennia.l tradItion of realistic phIlosophy that
has its roots in the thought of Plato and Arlstotle.}O
The contemporary realists reaohed agreement in a

~ch

greater area of philQsophy than either the neo-realists or
the critical realists.

Their position on the subJeot of

epistemology, however, remains our ohler interest at present.

of

30The follow1ng are 80me
the 1mportant po1nts ot
a.greement of the oontemporary rea11sts!
1. Being cannot be reduoed to sitter material be1ng or to immater1al being.
•
2. Empirical evidenoe ahows that both modes ot
being exist in the oosmos.

.
f

3. This oosmos cons1sts of real, substantial entities ex1sting in themselves and ordered to one another
by real extra-mental relations.
~
.
4. These real entities and relations tog other with
known artifaots oan be known by the human mind as they are
hI the:nselves and can b$ aesthetically enjoyed.

5. Such knowledge, aspeoislly that treating of
human nature, can provide us with immutable and trustworthy prinoiples for the guidance of individual and sooial
action.

6. Important truths are oontained in the classica.l tradition of flatonia and Aristotelian philosophy.

r,

John Wild, Th! Return ~ Fta.S9
PP. 357-363.
These pages contain the oomplete piat orm of the oontemporary rea.lists in a.ddition to the prinCipal propositions
mentioned a.bove.
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The contemporary realists bold that every act of aware.
ness 1mpl1es an object of that awareness.

Indeed, the act

01' awareness would have no meaning apart from term1nating

in an objeot, beoause the object gives the act of awareness
its determination and. meaning.

Wl1d expresses thls not10n

of awareness when be S8.ys that,

I!Awareness 1s directly

.

given as a peculiar, relat10nal actlvity of sens1ng, feel1ng,
remember1ng, definjng, and Judging, defInItely centered 1n
the psyohophysical orsan1am of the agent of awareness. These
acts are always Intentionally relat1ve to some objeot.

1

cannot feel without feeling someth1ng, I cannot remember
w1thout

rememberlr~

something, I cannot judge without Juag-

ing something. ",1

..

This aot ot being aware of something makes no change
in the object known.

There is a certain change in the

.

knower, however, in the sense tbat he 115 now aware of some
ob.iect of wh1ch he was not aware before.

act 1s ••• a un1que,

m

gener~!,

"The knowledge

relational aot, terminat-

ing immediately in an at least presumptively independent

"Xl
J
1blg., p. 50.
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object, wh1ch 1t 1n any case leaves unobanged and w1th which
1t, therefore, unites 1ts agent 1n a relation of immaterial
1

This description of the knowing prooess is a tar
cry trom the materialist1c-behavioristic interpretations

80

common 1n the explanations of the earlier realists.
As regards the general nature of" cognition Wild i.
quite explicit in stating that it 18
partly immaterial .1n

oharaoter~

~artly

physical and

He mainta1ns that even on

the sensory level a certain kind of awareness is involved
in sensory cognition.

Sensation as such 1s

~ore

than the

pb)"8ical aotivity involved when rorexample l1ght waves or

.

sound waves reaoh the eye or ear trom 80me physical object •
"Hav1ng one's eye colored blue is not to be aware

of

having one's head vibrate i8 not to sense sound,

The

'

blue,
"-

par-

sical presence or something 1n something phySical 18 not
knowledge, though it may condition knowledge. R)3 Wild gives
three reasons to show that noet1c presence is d1tferent trom
physioal presence

.~n

32ibid., p. 157.
3.31b1d'., p. 408.

on the purely sense level.

He saY8

30
that physical change involves three processes which are not
found in the act of sensation as such.

These changes are

the follo"ing:
1. Physical change always involves some matter already
formed which is capable of receiving some opposite form.
e.g. the ehange from hot to cold.
2.. In this process the matter d"O&s not become the
form itself, but becomes united with it in a third
entitl whioh is neither the one ~or the other, bu~
a oom ination of the two •.

3. The torm of the matter 1s numerically distinot
trom the form ot the oause.~

These physical changes are not fulfilled in the aot of
sensation, but rather a different sort of Change takes
place.

Wild summarizes the changes that take place in

,

•

the aot of sensation as follows:
1. When an object comes under the 8enses that objeot
is not destroyed physically 1n order to be grasped
sensibly. Nop do we destroy the opposite form of the
object in sensing it. We do not have to hear a low
sound in order to hear a high II ound.
2. The noetic faculty in the act of sensation knows
the objeot and not some third entity which could not
be the objeot but something else •

.3. The form of the objeot must in58~e sense .be
grasped by the senses in knowing. 3

34 ibid •
35.1Q.1s1., PP.

408-409.
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From this consideration Wild concludes that noetic
existence is something quite different and distinct from
physical existence.

Moreover he asserts the higher ani-

mals and man in particular are able to overcome the subjective isolation proper to purely material beings, because
of their cognitlve faculties--elther sensory or intellectual.
The contemporary realists also hold to a radlcal or
essential distinction between the operations of the senses
and the intellect.

The proper object ot the' senses is the

individual material object, whereas it is proper to the
intellect to abstract the universal nature or es.ence that
is found in the individual sensible object.

They stress

.

the striking . degree ot communicability that the operations
of the intellect have over the operations of the senses.
The senses and the intellect have the same object materially speaking, but different objects formally speaking.
In other words the oontemporary realists maintain that the
mind and the senses know the same

extra-me~tal

object in a

different way according to their respective natures and
capacities.
The object of the senses 1s restricted to the here

32
and now.

It has a detinite position in time and space,

and is as suoh incommunicable.

On the other hand the

object ot the intellect i8 not limited to this time or
place, but i8 univepsal.

The intellect i8 able to ab ....

stpact trom the material conditions of an object and consider it in its univepsal or cOt:nmUnic"able aspect.

Sinoe

.

the operations ot the senses and the intellect ax-a proportioned to or specified by theip objects, the difference
in objects in these two cases pOints to a difference in
the

nat~e

of the senses and the intellect. 'Such 1s the

position of the oontemporary realist. as to the nature of
,,

the senses and the intellect and their operations.
The Thread of Unity in Fifty Years
of Amex-ican Realistic Philosophy

In considex-ing the realism of Wild and his associates
we have certainly come a long way from the first strivings
of naive realism in this countpy.

Real progress has been

made in analysing and defining the various elements in the
knowing process.

All the realists had one 'basic purpose

in mind, and that was to give a satisfactory explanation of
the validity and process of human knowledge.

Thel~

goal

purpose was to establish a theox-y of knowledge based on,

op
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and in accordance

wit~the

and observation.

A·l1 the realists of oourse did not at-

tain that goal.

requirements of experience

•

The contempora.ry l"ealist movement in

seeking its roots and inspil"ation in the classieal l"ealism
of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas gives a real foundation
for the hope that it will be the 'bearel" of true Pl"ogrsss in
rea.1istio philosophy.

.

Though the conte.mporal"Y rea11sts ac-

cept the classical realist trad1tion, they continue their
efforts to adapt the t1"aditional realist principles to
modern times and conditions.

In part1eular/ they apply

tho principles of traditional realism to the progress in
the sciences.

This eftopt has been the' goal ot all the

'f

•

Amerioan realists.
The Debt of Amerioan Realistic Philosophy
to William Pepperell Montague

William Pepporell Montague. whose 'thoug...",t is the subject of this thesis, played an important nole in laying the
foundations of contemporary realism throuS'" his contributions to the neo-realist movement, and his 'ol"iticisms of
the oritioal realist movement,

Montague was one of the

first detendel"s of realism against the

Royce.

Again it was Montague who formulated the first

basic thesis of neorealism that was acceptable to most
neo-realists.

This formulation included the notion of

epistemological monism, Which subsequently became a oharacteristic tenet of the neo-realist position.

Mope over

his derense of nee-realism against tne attacks of the cri-

.

tical realists involved a special use of the word or term
consciousness.

He looked upon consoiousness as merely a

relation between objects.

VIhen we are conscious of some-

thing it merely means that physical energy
is impinging upon OUP sense organs.

~om

some object

Montague looked upon

the potential energy of matter as equIvalent to sensation
or consoiousness.

•

Ria theory of oonsciousness influenced
.

the development ot his episteMology.
The object of this thesis is not to prove that everything that Montague held or even that most of the propositions that he held in regard to realism were correct, but
rather to give an explanation of the philosophical teachings
of this man who so greatly influenced the b,eginnings of the
realist movement in our country.
In the next chapter we will consider Montague's theory
of knowledge and consciousness.

Montague in working out

35
~:1is

epistemology sought the elements of truth in neo-

realism, critical realism, and idealism.

~e

will consi-

der in the. follo"."Jing chapter Montague's use of these three

systems of philosophy in working out h1s own epistemology.
Underlying his solution to the epistemological problem of
the knower- object relationship 1s hts theory of consciousness.

Montaguets theory of consoiousness will also be Con-

.

\

sidered in the next chapter, because ot its influence upon
his epistemology.
In the third ohapter of the thesis we will evaluate
Montaguets epistemology and theory of consciousness.

The

strong points and weak points of his epistemology and

th~ory

•
of consciousness will be considered in order to understand

.

Montaguets contribution to the development of realistic
philosophy in America.

CHAPTER II

WILLIAM PFPPRRELL MONTAGUE'S TrmORY OF
KNOV'JLEDGE

An analysis of.' "Nilliam Pepperell Montague's ep1stemology leads to the conclusion that Montague took a positive
approach to the solution ot the knower-object relationship.

.

He had great respect for the efforts ot his predeoessors,
and tried to inoorporate as much of their findings as he
could in his own solution to the epistemological problem.
The three systems of proposed solution to this problem that
Montague systematically analrs_a were that of Objeetivism,
,

Dualism, and Subjectivism.

r

Objeetlvism (so-called by Montague) maintains L) •that

.

extra-mental reality exists independently of our knowledge
of it, and 2) that in knowing extra-mental objects- "e perceive them directly and in themselves.

SubjectIvism to

Montague Y/as the dootrine that the object of knowledge is
really constituted by the mind.

By dualism Montague meant

the representative theory of knowledge.

This means that in

knowing an object, we do not know the object directly and as
such.

iIlhat we know direotly is our idea of the object. This

idea is caused 1n us by the sense-data of the object.

36

The Three Bas ic V!ays of Interpret ing Knowledge
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Montague expressed his notion that there are three
basic theories as to the knowledge process in the following quotation.
On this question there are three classic theories
which have contended with one another for acceptance. First, there is the theory of "objectivism"
or epistemological realism Which holds that objects
exist exactly as they are apprehended, that things
are in themselves and apart from WI just what they
seem to be when we experience them, and that oonsciousness reveal. directly the nature ot external
reality. Secondly there is the theory or "subjectivism" or epistemoiog ica1 idea11sm which holds that
the nature and existence or an object is constituted
by its relation to a mind or' subject, and consequently
all reality in so tar as it can be conceived at all
must b. conceived as conscious ex~rienoe. Thirdly,
there 1s the "representative" or oOPY" theory of
knowledge which we have called epistemological duat~
ism. According to this theory Ob~ects are of twqlUnda, internal objects or "ideas depending upon
consciousness and directly revealed by it; and e~
ternal or physical ob,ecta which are independent
of consciousness and neve~ direotly experienced by
it, but .11eh can and must b.3~erred as the hypothetical cause or experience.
Montague uses these three positions as the basis ot
his own epistemology in the sense that he tries to extract

3~\fi11iam Pepperell Montague, !h!. Vlays 2!. Knowing,

PP. 32-33.

the

elerr~nts

of'ux-uth that.

Sll'¥f)

oontaiuoc in each

SYfJt,6tt.

Ee says that nwe \'1.'111 tl'y to show that tho ~ival contentions

of objectivism, subjeotivism. and dualism can be restated
i'l'om a realistie standpoint in such. a way as to be made not
only eOlnpat1ble with, but itnpllcatlve ot one anothOl....

To

'the extent that our effort 1s suocessful the episternologiaal
pl'obls!:l wll1 have been solved.

And

lt

will have been solved

by the reduotion of the three previously

opposod theories

to t::ree dlverse bl.lt mutually supplementary methode

or

in-

tel"pret1ng the single set of racts involved 1n the xaelatlon
or a knower to the object known. wl7
Objectiviam:

Its strength and \';eaknosa

•
'l

The first theOPy
1$ ob;jeotlv1sm.

'.f!h19

or

knowledge which Montague disousaes

theory takes three dist1net f'ort'lS-ex-

treme ohjeotivism, moderate
objectivism.

ob~eotivlsm,

and relnt,lvlstl0

?he firot of these tbeoro1ea (l.e., extrema

obJectivism) teaches that every exper1enced object ex1sts
as it 113 exper1eneed and th!'4t 1ts exlatenc(t 1. cOI:1plotely

.. ...

39
In,Jependont of' its beinp, experienoed.

The seeond 113

m~

orate or eOJl'lttIOn senllo objectlv!.8t'n ,,1110h l'eeal-ds as sub-

jootlvo all that is unroal and regards as objoctive ,11
that is

p~uyslcally

';lila physically real is consid-

real.

ered by moderate objectIvism as indo pendent in Its existence of the knowing mind.
tl'~ls

'rho third "and final form

theory 1s the relatlv1at;S.o or

holds that the C01.1C1.9Ote objects of

nat'l.l,re to the

~lQtlon

l'fn~w"

or

object1vism whIch

pel~ceptlon

owe their

in wh,leh they stand to the individ-

uals that peroeive them.

These three forma 1)t objeotivism

oonter their intersst and attention on what constItutes
one oJ" the basIc problema of eplstemolog1. 1.e •• the na-',
;i-

t'l:l:Pe

f

ot the extra-mental object.
The opistemological problem

situation that is p:x-esented

ual apprehends any

80f1't

.
htil~

WllE:meVOr

ita origIn "1n the
any sort of IncUvld...

or objeet."38 The ohief question

that arIses in th1s A1tuatlon 1. "''bethel'
.......................,

381bld., p. 237.

39 1b1d •

01' ...........
not -tho ........
o'b----

Naturall,. we have no expe:rlenee ot a situatIon in
whlch"e ob••x-ve An unobsoned ob jeet.

The veP"! aot

knowIng an object _ke. the obj.ct .. known object.

or
It 1.

impossible to know objects apal't tpom the knowing aot. No
philosopher would sak

U8

to know aft objeot aplll't trom the

aot of knOWing It. Yet 1t ls

~ol.el.,.

on. this point that

some phlloaophePe conclude that the o~j.ct 1s constituted
by OUP 'knowing It.4.0 MOfttagueo express.s hls opinion on. the
matte:r thus.

"!he pre.enoe ot oonsoiousness togethe:r with

the objeots ot
ence

or'

~lch

we

.~e

conscloua ••• le.~1 the depend-

independenoe ot the objeots an open question to be

decided by tntePence fr;om the11- behaviOl'" While UDdep

observatl~. tt4l

,

,

•
of.

'+0Montagnesald in an ironio fashion that the pseudo-

solence of .1~ol087 haa a tlPmep basi. than ideal18m 1n
the sonae. that astrology does not maintaIn that the ve~
ex1atenoe or the stara 18 the proot ot their Influenoe on

human artair-a.

41wI111am p. Montague, "Contessions of an Animist1c
Matol'lallat, It cogteSOl'tM A-V0lft ~lOS.hi' vol. II e4.
by GsO%tge P • .AC'tams ana :\ltam ~. ~oiiisuet t ~1I9W Yol'k, 1925) ,
P.

422.
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The subjectivists, however, maintain that the co-pre.-

ence 01' object and consoiousness proves that consciousness
Is constitutive 01' the object.
1'01'mtJ

has not been guUt,.

or

Objectivism in its various

thls partloulu cassumptlon.

All three torms of objeotlvism hold that the expe.l"lenced
object exist. apart fpom our experienoe ot it.
The ext,.._ objeotlvists hold

t~t

every experienced

exists, and that it always exiats .a we .ctually experience
tt. There really 1s no distinction between a true experlenee

and a talae experlence 1n thIs 8J8tem. Thls'PQaltlon because ot ita naive

.~and

on the problem ot error and l11u-

.•

.1on has no Significant toll owing among phllosophella.

• beModerate object1vlam, however. makes a dtstlnction
•

tween the real and the unreal objects of the senses,

oonsiders the

r~

•

It

as real and objectlve .e doe. extreme

objectlvism. The unreal objeots ot the 3enS88 it oonsiders
to be subjeotive and does not

t1*y

to locate them 1n real

apace. "It regards a8 marely subjeotive and excluBlve17
Inslde the m1nd all tr..at 1. unreal, while
all that 1s ph781cally real 1s regarded

a8

~t

the same t1me

independent of,

or external to, the mind, although directly and ImmediatelY'

present to It. n42
The weakness of r.:.odel'tate objeotivism aocordlnp: to

J,7ontague 1s that It leaves the ohoice
1.'1'l11oh objeots

Or'

select! vI ty of

ot perception are x-aal a!'1d which ax-e \l!lr'eal

to the judf",ment of the individual knowor

CD:'

-'ontaeue expre •• ea h1a objecti::>n 'as follows:

oal we.knoss of the common-sense

real~sm

i"nct that the admittedly roa1 objeets ot

obserwJ.'l.
"The techni-

consists in the
0Ul'"

expel'ienoe oan

be shown to be (selectively) raDIative to the minds that

know them, to exactly the

sanl$

ext.nt

a8

th.·objeota of

the most .fantf18tlc dreams J and If seleotive :relativIty 1m-

plies subjectiv1ty 1n the one oase it should imply it .eqUal. •
It two obeel'V91'S see an object dVf8P.

ent1.y because of the defeot in the sight of one

the

quo~t:ton

that really a%"ises 18

whethe~

of the view of. the obsst-ver with the

ol)s~rovel",

the obj8etiv1ty

unlmpat:~ed

vision oan

bf) aooepted.

For hoy; do we lrnow that the sensos 1n {l;ood

\1orkinr, erda!"

~1ve

us a

tl'UO

knowledge of reality?

This

seer;,1nr: relativity ot the objC!ot of pel'oaption to the 000-

~ i ..,

L!'"~~'111!e'l.'!l p. ~·!onta~e. The, wa~8

43 1'bld.,

p.

241.

.2!

Knowlns, P.

240.

h3
dition ot the

viewe~

invoked this novel explanation of the

act of sense perception on the part of the new objeotivists,
The rolative or new objectivists explain the distorted
image of an object by appealing to the entire visual situation, that is, to the situation that existed at.: the time
of the distorted perception of the object.

For the new ob-

jectiv1sts maintain that " ••• the concrete objects of perception owe their nature to the relations in which they
stand to the 1ndividuals that peroeive them. nW.+

This means

that in oU!' example the eyes of a person suffering from a
distorted perception must be considered in view of the past
slmiliar

ima~es

that the person has experionced.

This 1s

done not only to enable the person to make a praotical adjustment to hi. particular situation, but 1n order to explain the present distarted perception as a true perception
under the partIcular ciroumstances whioh the person 1s
facing.
No matter how much may be saId about a distorted perception belng a pecullar type of true perception, a dIstorted perception oan be explainod only in terms of

Q

true

44
pe~ception.

true

The relative objectivists themselves use the

pe~ception

.s tho criterion to m$4sure where a parti-

oular distorted peroeptlon should f1t 1n as an act 01' .ense
peroeptlon. The tact that the true perception Is used by
the relative objeotlvists .s a

perceptions lndloates that even

to measure

no~
~ey

dist~t.d

bhlnk there i8 more

.

realIty w ts-uth in the true perception, than there 1. 1n
the distOJl'ted peNeptlon.

Nontague In examining the 1'818-

tiv. objectlvlst posltion on thiS matt •• points out the
weakness ot the relat1ve objectivist explanation of a dIstorted peroeption by the taot that It must be measured and
interpreted in te!"ms of a t!"ue peroept Ion.

He says that',

nThe diffioulty 91th this posItion conslsts 10 the 'tact•
~

that th. dl..81" •• appearanoes ot the same thing in dlft...
ent context. always pre.uppos.s a single prlmaPy system of
event••••and It u by _ana

or thts slngle public and

pbJ'-

sioal system that the va!"lety of pplvate and subjective
perspeotiv•• can be explained and baPmonl••d.~S The great
emphasls that 1s placed on the tPUe
~elatlv.

perc.p~lonf

.... n bJ the

objectivists, lndlcat•• the unreal1ty of the object

45
01.' a distorted peroeption.

There 1s muoh in the objeotivist theory 01.' knowledge
in all of its three
acoeptable.

d8~"8

He was in full

or torms that Montague round
a~eemeot

with the objeotivist

position on the independence of the objeot 01.' knowledge and
on the d1l"ectnesa 01.'
agree,

hOVlOVW,

0lJl9

knowledge 01.' object..

.

He dId not

with the objectivist position that evGr'1

experienced objeot 18 a real objeot, because

or

the man7

diffioulti.s In this posItion When 1t gave an explanation
of """Olt and illuslol'h
Dualiam.

It. StPenBth and 'leakoeas

•
The aeoood theory 01.' knowledge which Montague'conaid-

.

ered was that of dualism.

Montague desoribe. what he means

by epistemologioal dualism in the l10es that tollow.

" •••Epistemologioal dualism has no bearing Whatever upon
the tttuth or talsity ot PS7oho-ph7s1oal dualism.

It il not

oonoeltned w1th the pelation 01.' miod to body Olt 01.' ideas to
brain

pPOCEUJSEU',

but only with the pelatiot:l of the data ot

experience to the external object. Whioh are be11eved to
oause those data • ..4.6

461b1d •

6

In his opinion the thewy of eplate-

4.6
mologieal dualism has three strong points.

ae indioated

these strong pOints as tollows:
1. The convenient manner in whlch lt deals with
the problem or illusion and error.
2. The equally convenient manner 1n WhIch it
deals with the problem of perceptual relatlvlty,
that is, the problem that arlae8 fi-om the seeming
dependenee ot .en.e data upon the positIon and
general eondition of the percipient or those data.

3. The conven1ent means !/h1oh i£ provides

i'w explaln1ng th.4~bject1V. world 1n terms or pure
quantity ••• ft 7
Montague examined duallsm at oonsiderable length.

dualIsm he means the representatIve theory 01'

BJ

knowledge~

according to wh1ch we do not dIrectly know the object as
it 1s 1n ltselt, but only the sense-data.

.
Duallsm .18 .the

name that Montague gives to the pOSition of the critic.l
realists.

This dualist positIon takes two torma 1n regax-d

to its explanat10n 01' ewOl".

Aa regards errors 01' sense,

the dualists hold that they are oaused when the effect produced upon the brain by the external objeot ralls to o owe,.,·
spond wlth its cause. F.rx-ors ot intellect, on the other
hand, are produced when one makes false interpretations and
inferences trom the sense-data gIven by the object.

It

47
otten happens that both types or error atte px-s.ant at the
same t 1me 1n a g1ven act or percept 10n.
The natU'l'al objectIon to this explanation of' el*POP 1.
that acowdlng to the px-lnoiples ot dual1am, the knOWftr oan
nevel' know the object as .uch but only the ••nse data caused
by the object.

Thi. beIng the ea •• , lfontague objects to the

dualist poaitioo that the dualist

ean.t~ow

an erroneous

peroeption because it n.1la to' correspond wlth the external
The dualists aooording to theitt own prolnolpl••

objeot.
deny that

w. know the object .a such 1n the 'ct of knowledge,

the-retot'e theY' cannot appeal to the objeot as the orlterlon
,

ot a true or talae perceptIon.
In

"ontasue'.

r

•

own .platemolora be does aemand·. cor...

x-8spondence betwe.n the mlnd and the object .s the crlterion

ot a true peroeption. 'rhia cOPt-espond.noe, however, i8 not
baaed on anr intuItion ot the objeot·.

Rather It 18 ba••d

on our X'emembJtanoe ot similar a.nae Situations in whioh •
81ml1a~

object produoed a

alml1a~

ettect on the braln.

The

brain through the extol'nal senses is Hceptlve ot ene:r-gy
coming trom extePnal objeots.

The reoeption by the braln

ot thls external enel'S"! 18 expe!'leDoed
an act of aenaatlon.

by the pax-ceival" .a

• ••• 88naations are 8a truly types ot

48
pbJ81eal energy

aSQ~e

motions themselves, It 1s mJ theory

that the,. are the .n2!!-klnetic forms ot .energy Into which
motions disappear and tram wh1ch they reappeal'. "48 The
presumption 18 that the effect produced in the wain by

the object 1s tbe same aa the cause that pr"oc!ueed it.

The only subjective factor tn

or

sensation 1. the physical

sense organa.
quotation.

Mohta~.• ts

oondltlo~

or

the

ep1stemology
b~Q1n

or

He atates thll posIt1on 1n the following

"'~h.n

we pereelve an object the on11 direot

and proximate determine!'

01'

the pct1"cept 10n 1. the C ondi-

tion tlnally p1"oduced 1n the brain.

What thIs cond1t10n

\"1111 be 1s thua determined partly bJ the nat1..lJ.'te ot the 8Xte1"nal objeot fpom whioh energy 1. emitted, and paptly• by

.

the condItIon and natUl'e ot the perceiving b1"aln.,,49

The dua11sts cannot give this simple explanatIon of
error, because What they direotly know il not the object
but the .treat ot the objeot on the bp.in by means ot the
aense-data.

The dualists give as muoh a ph,.sical existence

to the sense-data •• they do to the

I~Bwl1li.m

P. Montague t The Ways

49wil11am P. MontagUe,

!!l!. Wa:•

object~

This posltlOft

!!.! ThInf)s, p. 4.84.
.s! KnowInS, p. 2.$2.

causes them much dIfficulty 1n explaining the act ot peroeption.

":lnen a dualist sees some extelmal object, for ex-

ample a tree, he must go through the following steps to

explain the process.

The extra mental,tpee produces a sen-

sation of itself oalled the sense-data 1n the knower.

This

sense-data 1s a mental oopy of the extra-mental tree.

This

copy is just a8 phJ810al .a its cause,_ otherwise it could

not trul7 represent the

object~

data muatcontain all the

ThIs means that the 8enae-

characteristic. ot the objeot in

order to give a valid knoW1edge ot the object. The external object ex1stsln space and ti_. and this condition

must then be round In aome way in the .ense-data.

The

•

sense-data obvIously doe. not exIst 1n the external" or pub~

lIe spatio-temporal ord81'. Thel'etore, there must 1>8 two
spatia-temporal orders, one

rOt.'

the othel' ter the •• n...data.

nat10n is that we have no
temporal :realm.
that

"Jll!!

!!l4

expe~l.nc.

ot an

inte~.l

spatio-

.!e whioh .1lll!. W,lc,.l oauseali
.2!!! .l?! located.!!.!!l!. SHoe !.!!.4 t,~ .!t !h!.

•• n8e-dat~ the.elve•• "SO

-

The trouble with this expla-

Montague..-1 te8 1n :rete:rence to this pr-oblem

OMI space

.2! sense-data

real ext:ra-mental objects)

timo

F01"

OU%'

.en,•• tell WI onl,. or

50
one apatlo-temporal Ot'der, and that is as much a pax-t of
ext:ra-mental reality as the Object itaelf',
ffhe dualists have the same diffioulty wIth the notion

ot time

a8

they do with the notion ot spaco,

According to

the dualist. t mIte must be two real attderaof t1me: onc frr

the sense-data, and th.e other tor- the- external object.
;;:very event muat take plaoe in time, apd tor the dualist
eve"t"Y event 10'9'01.,,88 two faotorsl

1)

the external ewnt

vlhlch 1s objective, and 2) the internal subjeotive event.
30th

these events in the dualist position art. real, Elnd

both must exist 1n real time as well as 1n

~al

apace; but

the internal event ot the sense-data doe. not exist in the

same t1m.e medium

'8 tho axtex-nal

•

objective event. "The oonof.

elusion that t.."te dualists draw .rx.om this sItuation is that
there must be two tempo:pal order.

111

the physical W01'Ild,

one far external objective eventa, the other tar
subjeotive events.

Inte~al

Montague objeots to this conclusion on

the lame ground. that he objected to the oonolusion that
there were two distinot spatial orders.

objeotion
Qnce

or

".:Pel

~e

groUDda ot hIs

that the dualist oonclusion as to the exist-

two temporal ordetta 1s oontf'ary to the evidence or·

experienoe.

we are not aware, he sald, of two temporal

51
Ql"<lcrs, bttt only of the one extc:rnal temporal order of objectIve events.

we must conclude that the time

f~l&refore,

of' tho:-;o physical objects or causes of sensation Is the same
as tbe

ti~11e

ot the sensations thenmelves.

Both t lmes ar-e

one and the same} that Is, both have the time of the

exte~

na1 event.$l
Montague agrees wIth the
there Is a subjectlve facto%"

dua11st~

to. the knowledge process.

dlt'H'lgt-eea with them, however, as

or this subjeotive element.

when they say ·that
He

to the extent and b •• is

The dual1ats maintain that

onl,. the sense-data 01.' the objeot oan be known dl:re:ctl,..
~,!ontague

insists that the object 1s knovm directly In the

sense tr£t the physical influenoe or the object
affects the organs at the knower.

.•
dl~e~tly
.

The only subjective fao-

tor that Montague admits 1n the Rot of senae perception 1$
the

p~~sloal

cond1tion ot the senses or the space between

the senses and the objeot.

Any d15tort1on in these oan be

corrected trom a remembrance ot past simllar eXp0%*ienc6s
when conditlons were nor-mal 1n the sense

Ol:"gam~

or 1n the

space 1ntervening between the knower and the object.

5l_
1b1d
.,

p. ~.
&V4-.

Subjectivism:

Its Strength and Weakness

,52

The third theory of knowledge that Montague treats is
subjectivism (the name that Montague uses When he refers to
idealism).

Subjectivism is defined by him as "the belief

that objects, particularly material objects, cannot exist
independently of a consciousness of

~hemJ

and therefore all

reality oonsists exclusively of oonscious being and its
states. "52

Montague shows tba.t there' are seven distinct

stages in the development of idealism.

He made these seven

divisions of the development of idealism on the basis of a
8

prinoiple of knowledge which he called selective relativity.
This principle of selective relativity means that our per,
,

oeption of objeots 1s determined primarily by our

~nclina

tion in the matter rather than by the force of the objeots
themselves.

Montague shows that each stage in the develop-

ment of total idealism depends essentially upon a wider application of this prinoiple of selective relativity to the
data of reality.

The degree of extension that is to be

given to this principle is determined by the choice of the
knower more than it is by the nature of the object.

52J:lli.,

p. 26,5.

"Which

53
th1nfis we shall know at any moment depends on our internal

states at that tn,omant ••• "')

rver,. expet'1ence that wo have

can be tt'Goed back to its cause which 1s

90100

external ob-

ject. but which objects we are oonscious or at any given
moment depend. upon our own internal dispositions.

"This

explains the curious relativ1ty of ob)eots known to the

person thtlt knows them. " relativity tpat la'seleotive t

but never constltutiYe, l1ke the l'elatlv1ty ot hlstOl"ioal
events to the 1-fords that desoribe them. ,,54

This p1'*1nciple

of selective relativity ot the objects known"to the knowel'

1s tho basis ot lt1ontague's delineation

or

the -seven stages

ot subjectivism" .55

"
•

In its first and most basIc stage subjectiv1sm consist.
0«

ln holding to the subjeotiv1ty of what we

real objeots.

0

ommonly oall un-

Among untteal objeots he include. the po1"oep-

tual and conceptual er:rors of conso1ous l1fe and the
1llusions and

d~eams

of sleep.

In support

or

this view the

subjectIvIsts hold that it 1" urll'Ellflulonable that the mind in

5'3·,~illl1am. P. Montague, The "',:a1s of Things, p. 672.
541b1d •
5'~The pr1nciple or seleotivlty i. a180 the b •• l. tor
Montague fa own selection or the elementa Gt truth 1n the pot

addition to its own pX'opert aotivities should aettve as the
storehouse of' porceptual

notion ot

th~

],fonta!,1u$ &xpl'"ElIssea this

8l"ttWS.

t1Iubjeotlvlsts as follows:

" ••• the m.ind in

addition to Its own ppopel" aotlvIties or thInking, willing,
and feeling, comes to be

o~ed1ted

se:rvlng as a vast dumpIng ground

w1th the function

·rOX' "all

or

the unrealities

ot

11te. wS6 To save the mind trom this needless
function the
.
t1I'st stage ot subjectivisM make. the•• illusions and
tt~eal.The1

el"l'0%'8

no longe:r exist in some hIdden spatlo-tempo.ral

system, but az-e :rega1'4ed as ol"eatUI'ell of tho"mind alone.
The second stage of' subjectlv18l'l'1 i. dellcl'lbed by
Montague as maintaining the subjeotivity ot the 88nl6-data

or the etrects ot the object on the knower.

• of
This stage

.

sub3eotlvl'm 1. tor all praotioal purpca.. IdentIcal with
epistemological dualism, and the same objections that ean
be made against dua11sm natUl'ally apply also to thIs stage

or subjectivism.

stage

or

Ca~l&d

to 1ta logioal conclus1ons this

subject1viam would

of reality,

~esult

1n two dIstInct systems

One would be the object1ve

sp~tIal

temporal

universe that we all know through experienoe, the othel'

55
would be an internal subjective spatio-temporal order that
has no foundation in experience. 57

The philosophIcal basis

of th1s stage of subjectivism 1s found in the applicat10n
of the prinoiple of selectivity to the sense-data of objects.
Montague expresses this dualist position on the nature of
perception,; as tollows:
~

the" f

••

12 perceive ir!J found to

objects .!!. .!U:.!

!1 any .!2-

depen~ directly and primaXti-

ly and seoondarlly upon the things outside of our org8nlsm~8
Fttom this poInt of view, theretore, dualism ls oonsidered
as Xtepresenting the second stage

The chIef

charaoterist~c

ot subjectivism.

of the third stage of subjec-

tivism is the view that the secondary sense qualities of',

•
objects are made dependent upon the mind for their 'existence.
~

By

secondary aense qualities Montague means those character-

Istics ot things that are only known by one of the senses,
and this includes such sense-data as the color, sound,
smell, and taste ot objects.

AccOl"dlng to Montague the

phYSical scient1st is inclined to agree w1ththls stage of

57 1b1d .,

p. 262.

58ibld_1 p, 267.

·ubjeotIvl.m, because It enable. him to give a purely
quantitative explanation. or the world 1n teftl18 ot the pz-l-

mary qualitles.of objeots,

However Montague objeot. to

thls attempt at reduolng reality to inolude onl,. the prI-

mary qualItie8 ot objeots.

In this v1e. ft",PhJ.lcal ob-

jeot. are eenter. ot Intlowing and outtlowlng energiea,
and the,. a180 oonslat

energl.,.u59

ot qualltIe8

0o:r:.....1at.d with

theae

It the external obJeot 1s the cau.e ot

OUP

knowledge ot It at all, tben 1t 1. also the oause ot thoa.
quallties bY' whioh the ext.rnal objeot ls ma4e knO'flll to

The.e qualities

aN

both prl_....,. and ••ooneS __,._

UI.

It the pr-l-

wbfo
the aeoond8ll7 qualities should not be objeotlve. Such• at

DIU'J' qualltle. ax-e objeotlve, then there Is

least 1a Montague

t.

DO •••• on

ob jeotlon to thi. thlPd deSZ'ee ot

..

aubjectlvism.
When ... come to the tOUl'tb atap

Of'

degre. of subjeo-

t1vlsm .. tind that the prinoiple ot ;relatIve seleotivlty
can also be applied to the primary qua11tIos of objeot••

ThIs objeotlve

dest~uction

of the prImary

~ualltle.

ot ob-

jeots really makes it Impos.ible to know external objects

59wil1Iam p. Montague "Oontempar~ Rea118m and the
Problem ot Pe;rceptlon', i! IV (July, 19(7), p • .381.

S7
In an,. rea11.tl0 way, because all their .ense peroeptlble
qual!tl.s, al'8 now made subjeotive.

In this stage ot .ub-

jectivlsm there 18 no c ....in contact with

~

realistio

knowledge ot even a 1I10rld ot aenee-data and their cauae ••
but the onl,. thing lett i8 a world ot knOWN and thehconscious atatea.

Nevertheless the Id.aliat at this atage

ot aubject!v!•• ho1da tbat there are

~.pt.ln

r.allty that all men ahare in cOIImoa.

The

notions about

ot cO,!:JIon

~.ct

as'l'....nt •• to the appe8l"anoe ot the extePDal world is too

ovGPWbelmlnB to be deniea bJ tbe subjeotivists at this ataRe.
At this .tase ot subjeotivism tbe taot. ot experience ape
.aved by a d1st1nction bet.en what

aP. oalled

the

or publlc ext>er1ence. ot men, and the particular

experienoes at individual men. The

t~

oommon
•

or pt'1vate
•

1$ regarded ••

aometh1ng common to all men and the same r.", all men,

~H

as the latter 1. regarded .a peculiar to eaoh indivldual.

An example of a oammon expet-i.noe aeewdlng to the ••• ub-

jectlvlsts would be our oonaoiousne.. or animal. and plant.
in the world, and an example of •
expet-lenoe would be

solous

or

80M

paln

Ott

par'loul~ OJ'

Individual

aoM. that we might be con-

in ouraelve••

Subjectivism, howevel'". can be cuu"ztied to gPeatezt lengths

sa
than the subjectlvity ot the primary qualities ot objects.
The next and firth stage ot subjectivism makes

the mind ont

or

c~e.tup.s

or

the oonoepta of spaoe and tlme. and out ot

the very cat.gori.. and law8 ot nature. Far the subjectivist argues that there is no good

~.'UJon why

the la". and

:reIatlona that exlst among thlnss' shoUld b. objeotlve, It
thinge the.elves are only consolous _:tates
should theH

~

Ideas.

at'

Why

objeoti" laft to "gulate subjective thlnga?

The anneX" to the que.tion 18 Obvloua.

indeed, to have .uch • situation.

It would be st:range,

Theret~.;

in this ataR8

ot subjeotivism the '1mple 801utlOl'l oonsle's in maldng the

la... and oategm-l.s of natu:re •• subjeotive •• 18 nature',
it.elf.

BJ

•

It

sP.atel" eneneion of the prinel"))l. ot selectivity

we come to what Montague calli the sixth stage ot subjeotivism.

In tta sixth .tage subjectivism oall. toX" the aubjec-

ti.,lt,. or the minds ot ethel" men in :relation to oupselve...
In such. vle. the ••
•• It 1s the absolute measure of the value
or X"e.llty. The 14••11.te oa11 thla ••It, .oon.ld.~ed a. the
objeotive measure ot l"e.11ty, ttHt absolute ego.

This abso-

lute ego includes not only our conscious being, but our whole
expel"lence

or raallt7_

~li.

total experience 1s here re-

.$9
garded as the expression of the deeper meaning of our
porsonallt1.

The finite salt 1s the name that these ideal-

ist. give to the .elf considered a8 one at the objects .siating 1n the world created b1 the absolute ••1£.60 By
means ot this Improvised distinotion between the self considered as the norm or on11 objective sncho.r ot experience, and
the selt oonsidered aa one 01' the
subjectivists

or

this stage

tbe world that has some

trY

d.~.

obje~t.

ot expertence, tbe

to glve an explanation ot
of conal.tenoy.

'rhere 18 one tinal atage 01' subjeoti"i•• , howe'f'ep, that
que.tions tbe objeotivity 01' tbeab.olute 8elt.

Por on what

gPounds, these idealists argue,oan a "alid distinction

~

•
made bet••en the absolute s.lt and the tlnlte .elf,· becaua8

..

all the objeota of

knower.

e:xpe~l.nc.

are

There 18 only one know••

~.Iarded

OJ'

as atatea ot the

selt and that 1s the

The ooncept ot the abaolute .elt i8 mere17

t1nite selt.
another object

or

experience ot the finite selt and all the

objeots ot experience are aubjeotlve in their nattute.
principle of relative seleotl"ity 1e here
extension.

~lven

The

it. tull •• t

The point has at last been reached where we are

60
no longer oerta1n of the exlstence ot the knowe%'.

Subjeo-

tlvlsm begins by deprivIng the objeot mare and more or l'eall ty and ends by trying to deprIve the knower ot existence.

The technical name 01' this degree ot subjectivism i8
solipsism.

Atter this consIderation ot the aevelopment ot subjec-

tIvism, Montague teels that we are In

~

good pos1tion to

see the pemlcloua nat'Ul'te ot tills theOl"1 ot l'eal1ty, and
the ImpOl'tance of' baaing our study 01' knowledge Oft eaPetully

eho••n principle..

Montague adds that a ve'lf'/ good r-eaeon

tor studying the tlnal stage ot subjeotivism1. to develop

real undel'standing ot the . result. of thl. theox-y 1n .oz-der
to be better on our guard aga1nat ita beglnnlnga.61· S~bj.e..

Ii

tlvlsm 1s

.ometi~s

hal'd

'0 recogn1ze 1n its early stagea

and can ea811y enter the pb1losophy ot e'Yen the moat determined reallat unl... he 1. an hi. guard against this tendeaoy.

To p:rove his point that the :realIst muat be on guard
against the tendenci •• of subjeatlv1am

~8.ent

1n the knower--

objeot :relatIonshiP. Montague reduoed the theories or objec-
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tivism and dualism to the tI:rat and second sta.ges of subThe cardinal prinoiple that Montague used in

jectivism.
his analysis

or

the various deg;rees ot subjeotivism was

the principle or seleotivlt,..

!,Iontague expresses this

of the principle ot selectlv1ty

88

foll·owa:

ft • • •

wt8

the argu-

ments in each case tor passing .t':T!om .- more 1"ealiatic to a
more idealistic posItion are mainly

b~80d

on a single great

assumpt1on-the assumption, namely, that '( seleotive) I'elativIty' implies dependence, and that because every known
objeot 1s (select1vely) relatIve to the knowing subjeot,
therefore it 1s dependent upon the knowing subject and Incapable ot exl.ting apart from consolousneeuh .62

The pttln-

•

alple of selectivity need not imply any dependenee; however,
of the object or lmowledge upon the knower.

•

The prinoiple

merely means that our own internal states have more to do
\"l1th what objeots we are conscious of', than does the foroe
of the object Itselt.

ThIs does not mean in any sense ot

the word that the objeot depends upon the knower

ro~

Its

existenoe, but only that 1 t depends upon th:e knower tor
beine known.
iIllIS

62 ibId., p. 23 8•

The Proposed Solution to the

62

Epistemological Problem
Montague uses the principle of seleotivity as the basis of his own system of epistemology.

He applies this

prinoiple to the systems or objectivism, dualism. and subjeotivism in order to find the "elements of truth" oontained
in the three systems.
of the principle of

The application that Montague makes

selectivi~y

depends upon his own judgment.

to the objects of reality
ITe tries to form his judg-

ment on this matter aocording to the evidence or experience.
h

He takes what he considers the basic proposition of each
system and applies the principle of selectivity to it.

The

first system that he considers in this way is that. ot •

..

objectivism.
The basic

~oposition

of the objeotivists according

to Montague Is that

"!!!~

exist physicallz

externallZ!a2!£! independent ot

~

Objects which!!! experienced

For him the word exist when it Is applied to an
-mind."6)
object means that the object has a oertain position In space

63
and time in the real universe.

A ~.al thine hag a certa1n

quantitative pOlit1on 1n regard to the other objeots 1n the
physioal unlver... Any experienced objeot that lacka these
quallfleatlons does not physioally exist.
rejeots the objeotivist notion that objeots
perience ex1st 1n 80me lnternal

tague does hold, however, that

Renee Montague

or

illusary ex-

spat~o-t9mporal

arder. Yon-

eve~ ~xperIeno.d

event or

objeot does have a definlte meanlng or ••••n08 wh10h eives
the objeot o.r- event a logioal ex1ateno. 1n the htlman mind

w even a possible physioal existence In th."external

woX'ld.

By means of this distinotion between logioal entities and
physioal entities !Jontague is able to aooept the objeotivist
~oposltlon

•

that all experlenced ob,eots .x1st as that pro-

..

position applies to logloal entities. but he rejeots lt as
applied to phys1cal entttl•••
The truth ot objeotivism i8 to be tound in lta poaitlon
about the natm-e ot reality •• aomething independent ot the
mind, but ita mistake watt to oonolude f'l'tom this taat that
eveX'y experienced objeot wa. a real

obj.ot~

For the objeote

of illusory experienoe are something eXp9l'ienoed, yet they

cannot be said to exist 1n the phJsical un1verse.

An, ex-

latence that they have 1. pux-ely in the mind ot the person

who experlences them.

POI' aooording to Montague

u!h! £!!l

unlverse COrlsists .!!! th1l ala.co-t,l!'!! .1atem.2! existenta,
tOfjeth!!\iwith all that

.!!

pr•• uRROlied

J?l

,that s"8tem. u (:4

This UtruthW or objeotivism that all physlcal object. exist
apart tl'om and independently ot the knowledge of the knower

.

i8 on. of the ba.1c teneta of Montague's epi8temoloS7_ Keeping 1n mind this "truth- ot
~ontague's

objectlvls~,

let

U8

consider

anal,..I. ot .'P1atemOlogloal duallsm.

Far the dual 1st the objeots ot .en•• peroeption are Independent of the mlnd. but

such.

~e

n....l" known

'b1 the mind as

On the other hand, the experienced objects or .ense-

tor their ez18'eoo••65 ~,~ont.gue
agPee& with the dual1ats ,hat the experienced objec;t aa• an
data depend upon the

kl'lOwelll

•

experienoe doe8 depend on the knower to'!! 1ts mental existence

n.

1n hie mind,

doe. not

agre., 11owe"ler,

with the dualist

conclusion that th18 posits the exl.tence of two distinct
syatems of r.allty--tbe one 1ntepnal

other

ext.~nal

ph781cal

an~

subjective, the

and objective, but both 87at.me papt of the

mat~181

universe.

Thi8 conclusion he .ay. 1s

~',',il11am P. Montague,

and B:.--rw,"

T~\e

!!!

"l\. Realistic Tb.~ of Tputh
RealiaS. (New York, 192$), P. 255.

6Swl11iam P. !dontagu8,

.!!l!. vvaIs !i!!

Know1na. P. 292.

6$
oont~ary

to the tacta ot

expe~l.no.,

because .e have no ex-

perience of a double sy.tem of spat1o-temporal reallt,. •.
The duallsts

that

the~

~rop08.

the following example as a proof

are two systema ot reality.

It a person looks

at a table and then oloa.. one 8,.e and presses the ballot
t!:le other, the image ot the table' wl11 move or beoome. dla-

torted.

Yet thla same peraon oan

ope~

both

ey..

or ask

some other pereon present In tho room, and find that the
real external table has not lrlOVed

The 01'11,. change that took plaoe
table.

()l9

ohanged 1n an,. way.

w.. 1n the 1mage ot

the

Thls prove. that the real table and the experlenoed

table cen va17

Inde~n4entlY'

of one another, b••ause the', ex-

perlenced table depend. on the knower tor 1ts

•

.xla~eno••
of.

The example certa1nl,. pt'ove. that the Image ot the
table can vat7 .t".rom the real table, but It doe. not Pl'tcmt

that the

~.al

ing the image.

table oan vary without this

v~l.tlon

atreet-

Tb.G dualist conolusion t:rom this example

:remains unp:royed, beeau•• it 18 not nec ••sary to posit two
spatio-temporal Ordel't8 to explain the

varl~tlon

1n the !mage

ot the table fr'oa the Hal table. The solution of thl. proDblem of the variation

or

the e.xpe:rlenoed object from the

l'eal objeot i8 found. aocording to Montague by making the

66

following distinotion 1n the act of
two entities Involved In

eve~

pe~oeptlon.

are

The~e

act ot perception. Ftrlt,

thore 1s the object whioh 8x8rolses oausal intluence on the
Imowe:r.

Seoondly, there 1s the knower whose sonses produce

the proper reaotion or response when acted upon by the causal Influence ot the objeot •. The result of this Inter-actIon
ot the objeot and the senses in the

of

ao~

p.~c.ptlon

Is

called the sense-data. This .en•••data Is the result ot
two eausea--the knower and the obje.t.

object and Ita oauaal intluence on the

Montague oalls the
knowe~

the exist-

enoe .,stem ot realIty, because Ita most distinctivG teature 18 the extstenttal independenoe of the object of

•

perception to the knowe.. The rs-aotion and !lesponse In

•

the mowEu' to the Influence or the object he calls the ex-

perl&no& system of' ~••11ty, bee.uae thIs

~eapons8

found and only tound in our experIence of'

~ality.

i. always

The ex-

istenoe system haa its foundation In the object, because it
consiat. of the objeot and the phyaioal 1nnuence that the
objeot has on the knower.

The experience s,yatem has Ita

foundation 1n the knower, be•• use 1t oonsists 1n the pa1"'tI..
oular rGsponae that the senses organs make to the influence

or

the external objeot. This roaponae involves a oomplex

67
sensory prooess that
cause of the

man~

with the different sanaes.

v~le8

physioal faotors Involved 1n the

Be-

op.~at1on

of both systems, there 1s a mutual Influence or oVG:rlapplng
of the, ettects 01' both systems on the knower.

Montague holds

that the meeting point ot these two systems 1s the act of
Knowledge.

v,'hat at f1rst e1ght seeme- to be a simple lmowel"-

object relat10nship is

1'••11,. aocordl~g

to !lontague

8

oom-

plex relatlonshlp between the physioal influenoe. of the
objeot and the c01lPlex sensor,. Nt.Pons.

or

the kno"er.

'rho

result or outoome of' thl. eomplex prooess 1.• ~the aot 01'

ltnowledge.

Monta~. exp1'88s8s

quotation.

" ••• eaeh

~1ng

1ts skull a sort ot oopy.,

thIs notIon 1n the following

with. mind carrie. about inside

op

•
map of the ex1n.-.-Ol'gan!0 world
•

..

H'Yeals a "wId ot
and then, not b7 just being a copy

••• The mental map that 1s he" and

objects that

a~. the~

nOW

or them but by functioning as a dynamioally and causally
erreotlv. substitute tw them •••• ln the hUl'ly-bttPly of peroelv1ng, :remembel'lng, and
r~

a~t1ng

.... annot :reallze thls,

we al'O oons41ous on17 ot the objects

the sensOl'1 statee mean

ot-

~ant

and not or

~e"eal them.,,66 The dualists

~V1I11am P. Montague l The Chances ofSurvlvins Death,
(CambJtldge, 19.34), pp. 37-jS;-
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are right aooording to Montague 1n asserting that the experienced obJeot oan vary independently ot the real external obJeot, but they are wrong 1n conoluding tha.t two
distinot spatio-temporal systems of reality are necessary
to explain th1s variation.

Montague explains this varia-

t10n by a distorted response on the part of the knower to
the influence of the object.

Th1s response takes plaoe at

.

the meeting point of the influence of the object on the
knower and the response of the knower to the object.

Thl.

is What he oalla the meeting point of the existence system
and the experience system.
The th1rd theory ot knowledge that

~~ntague

seeks

elementa of truth ln 1s 1dealism or subJeotivism. 'Montague
«

agreea with the propOsition of the subJectiv1sts that "all
obJeots are 1n some sense relative to the self and objeots

ot its poss1ble experienoe."67 B.Y this he means that experienced objects are relat1ve to the self, not that pbysical
objects as suoh are relative to the self.

Experienoed ob-

Jects are relat1ve to the self in the senae that every th1ns
that we perceive is to some extent determined by our own
inner states and processes.
67Wl111am F. Montague, l1l!. !!!Z.I .2t IWg w1nS, P. 303.

The not1on ot tho subjeot1v1ata that all experienced
objects cannot exist independently ot experIence 1s talso.
beoause It ove%'looka the tact that objects oan'be considered
1n various contexts.

An

objeot can be cons1dered as an ex-

perienced objeot, and 1t .slsts .s an exporience only In the
oonsoiousness ot the person eXp81"lenclng It.
ed object, haftve., has Ita real w

The expepleno-

.~l.tential

exi.tenM

apar't tl'om aDY expe:rlenee of 1t on the part ot the lm01feJt.
Montague brings out this point by the toll_inS gPaph.l0 ex-

ample.

Be .ay. wO ona ldep ••• the toothache t.Pb. Whioh our
pz'•••nt

1n

OUt'

• s an object ot oonoeption, and how

.8

ahall ooncelve It'·

trlend ls suttering.

it ia

conlolouane••

and 'When ... ahall ooncelve It dependfJ upon how and
our 'Wains are speciflcally exolted.

presenoe ot

OUP

•

'_eft

•

But the indubitable

lPlen4 IS toothaohe as a member

or

the .,..

stem or objeots oonceptuall,. .pprehended by you and me has

not the allght•• t dl1'8ot etrect upon Ita
.yate1ft or things telt by the autre,...P.

p~••• no.

1n the

It .1thel' you

01'

I

eea". to think or the painful event, 1t cor;ttlnu•• 'WIth undiminished tntenalty_w68 This example winge home the
po1nil that the conceptual eXp8%'lence of an object la noil

10
the physical objeot that .slats outsIde the mind, and
that

0Ul'

cea.ing to thInk ot the object bas no bea"'ing

on Its objective eXistence.
Aftel' thls consideratlon

or

the thre. 8Y8te. ot

abjectlY!,., duallsm, and subjectivism to tind the ele.
menta ot fttruth" that a1'8 oontained !n them, Montague " examine. the problem ot
round tor It.

81':P01"

to ••e 'If!hat solution oan be

He .a.,. that the pos8lbillt,. or eP.POJi both

on tNt .ens01'J 1...1 81'14 tbe Intel1eo1Jual level 18 rOUftd
In the act 01' knowing.

Se d••01'1be. the aotft

or

knowledse

•• the ..eting p01nt ot the exlsten•• 8ystem and the experience ayatem ot 1'8al1t,.. This Ie also the point whe1-•
the possibility ot

efttOP

apl.... What we oall

•

OUP "know-

..

ledge ot the ph,..loal world 1. the indl""t effect produced

In ua by the enel'gy flowing t.am the extpa-mental object
into our

~aln

thl"cugh the .ena. Ol'gana.

Thl. lnyolves a

very oompllcated proc••• ot cau•• and ettect, aotlon and
l'. . .ctlon

between the brain and the en.ll"onment t between

the cel'ebro-ael'vOU* system and the ob jeota . and tOPc.. present in the phYSical world.

the knowing prooes8.

This oomplicated Pl'oo."

1.

Because of the many tactors involv.d

at the meeting polnt between the mind and the physical
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world, it 1. at thl. point that the oaule of error and
distortion ari...
tague aa,..,

In l'egard to the knowing

PS-OC888

Mon-

"because of the Ind1r$ctnes. and oomplexlty

ot the process, the oerebral atatea that oondition our experience give only .• misplaced and dlatOPted presentatIon

ot theIr extl"a-bodl11 aawaes-henee
The situation, howevez.. Is not
l~ontague

tbe existence of ewOl'. ,,69
q~te

.a hopeless .a

fix-It paints it •. He saY8 that the brain has the

ability to oompenaate fOJ." peroeptual and conceptual illu-

slons.

.

On the perceptual level be give. the 4 example ot a

man walklng down a road.

The tarther he proceeds fi'om the

vi.watt the emallett be appeaJl'I to beoome in 81_.

Thl. 1•

•

the way tbattbe image ot a walking _n artecta tbe J'etina

..

ot the eye.

Howe,"., we know tJ-om

.~1"lenoe

that it 1.

the 1nope•• lng dl,tance between the viewer and the Objeot
that oause. the smallel' image and not -BY deoMa. . in the

actual ,1ae ot the obje.t.

On

What be calla the conoeptual

level, he g1".. the example ot the ,.tting sun. When the

.un .eta 1t appears to go down in the weat. neverth.l••••
we know trom the study ot aatponomr that the sun does not
I

•
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move 1n

to the earth, but that the rotation ot

~ete~noe

the earth on

1t$L~1.

sett1ng at the sun.

1. the true cause ot th9

appa~.nt

Our eyo8 perce1ve a setting sun, but

seience tell. us that the reality bere 1s different

~om

In both these ca.e., however. we were able

the appearanoe.

to make the propel" adjustments to· the- s1tuation, and thus
llr1"lve at

tPUG

knowledge 1n spite ot tpe talae impr••• lon

first given 'by the .enaela.
MOl'ltague compeea a p6l"Oeptu.al enOl' to a bad photograph that give. some true knowledge at ita 4ubjeot, but
it i8 knowledge mixed w1th apr-or.
~apha,

howe"p, can

something.

~1ve

A .erlea ot bad photo-

a talrly aooUPate

p1et~

ot, .,
•

Thl!lough a oompapl.on ot these pictures we oan
.

conetl'uct a good picture ot the object.

The sa. princi-

ple acool'dlng to Montague can be applied to ••nae illusions.
Tlutough

0tU"

man1 expert.noe. ot the same object ". can come

to an acom-ate knowledge ot what 1t 1s.

Montague expl'oa.e.

th1s view when he sa,.. "the m01'e ertecta we have ot th1ngs,
the le8. ambiguity there 1s in

• The totll\lit)!; of'

fa

theu- p01nt ,1mp11catlon •••

thlne:'s effects •••• wo'l..lld not, indeed,

be the._lv•• 1dentical with the thing, but they would be
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exactly and adequately implicatIve 0·1" it.,,70

and

t~ue

Both .~Ol'

knowledge have a plUPG11ty of causes 1n Montagu.-.

epistemology_
The notion· ot truth and talsity 1n Montaguets epistemology 18 found in the act ot making a judgment.

make a decislon about acme
that judgment true,

matt.~

An Inconect

we te:rm as a t.l•• ju.dgment.

that 1s correot we oal1
d.o~alon

on some matter

Montague understanda theae

judgments not 80 lI10h aa a OOl'l'l'••pOftdence ot

w1th reallty as he does the mental

extra-mental Peallty.

when we

01'

OW;'

idea.

b....n {\,xpre881on ot

By the wert! twth he .ana tJtU.

kno..led~, and by t be word error he meana tal.. lmowle4p •
Montague a180 ldentlti•• the notions ot the real and

•

~•

..

the }l,nPHl, "g\deHd .!.! objects

He aay. "I hold that the true and the tal.. are
ap!ctlftlI

!b!. rea,.

~

1"'8-

~~ no.sible belier ~ !gdS!!nt. w71 Br the term re.1 ~on
tague meana anything that aotuall,. exiate and hence 18 10oated

.Ot~ewher.

In space and time, or: at leaet something

that Is possible and hence has • logioal existence 1n the

7Owlll1am p. Montague,

71 Ib1d ., p. 2$'1.

.!!:!!.l!!! Rea11sm,

P. 298.
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mind of the

and

~

pe1'90n

_.

that knows it.

These two terms the real

...t_l'Ue
........ Montague Ident1ties n5 the same thIng consId-

ered trom

ditte~nt

or

polnt8

vIew.

An objeot Is termed

"];'teal" fl'-om the poInt ot vIew of its p6l'ceptlon or apprehension. and it 18 termed
some judgment made
~fontague

writes

Wt1"UO B

oonoe~nlng

from the point Of vIew ot

1t. Similar ideas of truth

&It. found 1n the

8Y8t~ms

of' objeotivism.

dualIsm. and subjeotivism.
These detinition.

towards

Ottt..'

or

lrtontague a1'o, perhaps, the key

understanding how 1t 18 that he fin.ds "truth-

in the syated or Objeotlvism. dualism. and subjectivism.
montague .aye that tor the objeotlvist

!!!h!

objeot

18 tbe tl'U...

lb.!.

!1t..!

dlvldual."

'at-

oona~d••e~

real

pOfJ.,lble oonsoloue bell.,t s£

The truth

Ind1;:v14ua~

.~

•
Judf2!!Pttl

the tSuallat 111 ",*l1latewr-s.n.
I

o,orreapgnda to :'hat

,e~lst8

outside

........

J?ll!. .!,u-

Fw th. aubj. .tl"tst the tl."'UfJ 18 defined as

""'!hatevex- \fQ\Qd l?! I,oi!lt,*£!s!c!,
absolute eXp!rlenoe. ff12

2Z !! .!U.-comEe~nd!M .S!:

These three distinct definitions can

~e ~.duo.d

the same ol"'!terlon of' t!'uth. aceOPdlng to MontagtUil.

to
Fop

the objectivist notion ot

t~uth

as "s judgment that asserts

what 1s real" wl11 agz-oe wIth the subjective cx-1terlon of'aa

single experIence being judged by •
beoause the mr:.re complete
a~mont

be said

m~o

expe~lence

wIll be in substantial

w1th the objective o1"ite2'lon.

ot the

complete experience,
l"he aam thing can

cOM"'espondence the-ory bf the dualists, be-

cause when the mind and the object trt~ly

tlgl"e8

on the unde:-

Itandlns ot soma object, the mind wIll also agl"ee 'lr1ith the

nOPm ot • more complet. expet-Ienee or the assertion ot the
Thls being the oa.. , thea. three normd or me.suro.

real.

ot truth aIte rea11,. mutuall,. 1mp1.Icat..,.
er than opposed to each other,

used

8S •

or

the truth. rath-

These tbree norms can be'r

threefold cheek on the dat. of

.xp&rIenc.~

•
and

•

the,- can be mutually helpful 11'1 the actual process ot check-

ing thi' data.
By

_ans ot thl. more aympathetlc approaon to the de ...

-

t1nlt1on of the true
, a. it ttl found in the three syatema
tJontague belleves that he haa toUftd a OOTmnOl'l gt'ound tOf.'t

poeslb1.e agree_nt among the thl-ee ry8teme.

fie balleves

that he haa .hown that the thPee systems are eaoh seeklng
the same b•• le truth in 1ts own way C oncel!'ning the nature

or the real world.

Far he says nIt has been our alm ••• to

16
ahow that all of the three epistemologioal theories can be
re.interpretad in such a way as to bring them into acoord
with the fa.cts with which they deal and with one another;
and we bold that in each oase this va.interpretation has
preserved what 1s pos1tive and essential in each of the
warrlng theor1ea.~1'

Th1s re.lnterpretatlon of the three

theor1es of epistemolo81 oonstltute. Montague's solut1on

ot the epiatemologioal problem'of the relationshlp between
the knower and the object known.
Montague undertook in his ep1stemology

t~

save the re-

all ty of our knowlede;_ of the world by showing the world to
be the true cauae of ou.r sensationa.

He opposed the dualist
r

claim that knowledge consisted of sen.e.aata. produced 1n us

bw the external object, but for his part held a

of.

~representa-

tiye" theory of knowledge by whioh we know the obJeot directly.
Though he agreed w1th the obJeotivists that we know objects
directly, he denied their premise that the errors and illusions ot experienoe have a physioal existence in the real
unlver8.~

Finally, he showed bow the subJeotivists quite

logically came to their oonclusions by giving the prinoiple
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of solectivity a greater and gPeater extension of meaning,
but he himself denIed that the data ot experienoe
its extension along thea. 11nea..

wa~8nted

FOXI' he denied that our

knowledge was In any senae constItutive ot reality.

Mon-

tague then used the principle ot .electivity and applied
it to the detlnltloM ot

l.!!!. ~ and-!.b!

saw In them the point of

l'"oncllatl~

between the theel'i.s

ot objectIvism, dualll•• and subjectIvIsm..

concilatlon

1'1• •

peal, because he
Wheth~

hi.

~

_uco.a.rut and hi. own lolutton valid ,,111

be dlaoWla.d in a later ••ctlOl'l"

We oome nO\t to Montague'.

thear,. ot con.clouan.... fhi. theory of consolowm.e8. haa

an ImpO!'tant

b.arln~

and oonnection with 14Ofttague'. eplate-

• •
mologr aa we shall ahow In the next ..etlan ot the thesis

..

TI10
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Theory of Consc1ousness Underlying
the Proposed solution

The valldity of Montague's· solution to the epistemological problem depends 1n

~eat

measure on the COl'pect-

noss ot his definitIon and conception ot the nature and

function ot com.. oiousness.

Thi. meanl that we WIt have

an undel"standlng ot what Montague mean:t by eonsol0U8nfluns.

Eo detines it as

,1;he pot.ntI!l .2£

ft • • •

1mRl1cQt~ve

pressinc.

!!!!. thins !! !. .page ..2£.tlmp .m vhlcp l!!t tq1n.s .&!. nOt
aetualll 2relent.w74 All t~A Object. 1n tho~. .t.rtal world
are limited to a dotint'. time and place. They are necesearll,. etrcumaCl"lbed by thea. bonda

t~..at

are 1n :Montae;ue , •

philoaophr an e.'ential part. ot the material unlver·••• •

..

However. there 1. one thing that 1. not so tled down 1n
its oper-atlona and th.at 18 the workings ot the I11nd or
consciousness.

Therefore conscioUSMSS 18 801:RGth1ng unique

1n the physical W01"ld.

COllae1ouanes8 gives to external

objects an existence other than their own 1n the tr.J.nd of
the pa:r8on that knon them.

Thetr external: f!S!Cutence how-

eve:r 18 somethIng qu1te 1ndependent ot consciousness.

00.1'1-
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sclousness amply make. us aware ot What already is.

This

faculty according to Montague jolns or relates us to
!~

n ••• object8

puts 1t as follows

~eallty.

of consciousness muat be

J1'(l!Ial independently ot the1l" standing in that l'elatlon••• bon-

sciousness ol'lmowledge can not be anything other than a "'e.
lation between them. n7S Ttlt. detinitlon 1s functional 1n
that It descrlbe. the operatIons of

o~n8clou.n6.s.

Accord-

lng to flontague the, actual natlU"6. or oonsciousness tx-orn

an

ontological poInt or vIe. conslsta 1n the potential ene1"R1
or matter.

Reality has tvo sldes aoo()1'ldlng to Montague's

general thew,.

or

matter: one aIde we caR .ee and measure,

the other i8 unseen and immeasurable.

or

The measurable paht

•

reality 1. all that 1" actual, the 1:mneasurable pal't le
ot

all that 18 potential.
liontague cons1der. this thewy, 1lhloh he ca118 bylep8YCh1sm. to 98 a basia

or

rect>rtol11atlon b&tween mate!'!.l-

lam and ld••ll"tic ontology, for, he wr1tes: "!h!, Rotentlalltz

!!!b!.

phnleal

.!!. !2!

actualltl.2£ J:.b!. ISchleal

!I. the 19t MJ.t.t:z ..9.t ~ phJ;II2I)..,,76 IV t~la

b6 means that

7~\il1l1.m P. ldontague frrhe Relat10nal Theol'1 of ConsOiousness and ita Realist c Impl1oations", Jr, II (June,
1905), P. )1). .
-.
.

t

76valllam P Monta ue

1'!";

e tfew R
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the source and natm'fJ ot nental aotivity 1s to be found in
~

v:r.cat to the physical solentlat UQuld

tial energy

or

called the poten-

matter •. '\:'ben thIs energy 1$ actuals..04. how-

ever, it 1s part or tr..s measurable unlv(J)}.tse and can be de801'11>&<1 in terms of rnathamatlcal quantity.

Montague .ees In tbe phenomenon of mind someth:lng

quite distinot trom other entIties 1n

~he

but stlll papt of the physical 'unIverse.

physioal world,
He alsorts that

the explanation ot the operations of the m1nd can be found
1n the energies ot matter:

"to treat mInd rul

Q

r1eld of

potential energy 1. to do jUllltlce both to ita uniquenes.
otstrtlct'UI'e and its homogeneity wIth the material world',
ot vih.lch It 18 an integral part."7?

Thore, 1s

.01'0

to the
C

physical wol'ld he adds than the llo1eoul•• and atOll18 that

constitute it. There 1s a180 that whleh 1.

bet~en

them

and give. them their unity of. 0otlon. ThIs thing between
the atOt'llB Qnd molecules of the material universe must; be
some field or fore..

Thismeana "that

.9 annqt ~os.&1'lll?! £ ourldell me:Pel:

ele.,

~

!!!!:!!! .2!.

s::oun~e,d

!.b!.

lIfe

!?1..!b!.

!a !!! ,oon8tltlWnt

bodl

p!rt~

.!n .! t,leld 2£ 8.Q_thlng ~ !.
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Fiold that 2!l'vadea ,theae partlo1es.,,78

It is in this un-

ifying field that 'ft':ontague fInds a sufficient explanatIon
tor tbe intellectual and volitional processea of the human
mind.

Us a material1st be see. the universe as

til

system that oontains within itself all the parts

closed
L~d

element.

neoded. to oxpla1n itaelf and oven' the - most elevated thought.

and des iros of_n_
:tng eystem••• ,,79

for- it'1 Gause

Oft'

"'rha phys leal

li' w.ld

1. a self support....

Thero 1s no need to look outsIde the WOI'ld
dil'oo.t1on ox- purpose.

All

the~.

la of :re....

alltY' exIsts 1n some aeOUe Ins1de the pl17IJ1cdl universe.
~Tbo

problem

Atheiam.

God 1s insoluble 1n terms

or

the traditional

The prOblem of 1,v11 is Insoluble 1n

traditional
uniV6ttSe

or

The1sm."ao

The core

or

revolves about 1118 theOJ.'4y

h1s explanat10ri

4.

f

t»e

of

or

f

.. the

to the nature of" mattet-.

Ho describos this thew,. about the nature

oalls h,.lopsyoh1sm a8 tollows:

te:t"lJ!lS

or

motter Vih1ch h.

"Oy b:Jlopaych1sm I wish to

IF

78'ibid., P • .$6.
79rI1111am p. Montague nThe nelattonal 11heory of Consciousness and Its neal1st!c Implications",' £.. II( June ,19(5).
p. 315.

8~'f1111am P. Montague, "Confession.s of an Animistic
!;Iaterla11st n , cont~;cor~ AZi"fA,t'1oan Ph110$oP,bz, od. by Adams
l~ Montague (New US! r:tl' .» ~) f P. :313-
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denote tho theory that all matter 18 instinot with something
of the cognItive tu.notlon, tllilt every objective event has

that self-transcending implication of other events whIch
V/;lf)n it ooours on the scale

~ltat

it doe. in

0l.1r

brain

Pl"O-

ceases we 0_11 consclousnoss. Hol Even the ability of man
to look into hlmso1f and be consoiou.- ot himself as a thinkel'" of thoughts-even this prooes$ of 861r-consolouaness Mon-

tague explains In terms ot the' energy

He says that

ft • •

01"

pow.rof fl'I.atter.

,The consoiousness ot our own stat••••• 1.

the oonsoloU8nee. at .aua moment of the brain processes

and implIcatIons of the just

pr~oedlng m~ment.

way and 1n this -7 01'11y can we be conscious of

In this
0008010\$-

..

The ph:Jsloal OI'gan of tho brain 1s the eontaine;p ot

all th1s

ene~81

$clouaneae.

Which 18 expresses internally to us as con-

Aa lliontague

In an organiam.

It is

say~'r

"TllO m.Ind 1s an organism with-

.t~Qch&d

to the bl"aln and pervado.

it, and 1f it 18 a rl.1d •••• lts stuft 1s the stuff of memory.
t.l~

ill lam P. UIontague at 81., '['he New He.11sm,
-- - - ,
P. 28'"
.".

O,!.".

the accumulated treces

or

sensational and suoh field ....llke

act1vityas it may posdeas seema coneeroned (1) with imposing patts:t'lruJ ot ae1r... tr-anscond1ng meaning upon tho sensory

contents, and (2) with imposing patt.rna ot pwposeful aotion upon the lntercoUl"se bet_en the body and the envUton-

meot. nO )
Q.t\

Yot oue nruat keep in mind tbat th8~e ls no radioal

essential d1rterence between the

m~nd

aod the bod1.

f,!ontague holds t.hat all realities 1n tl"l& world

lcall,. the same in tbat the,.

aH

811 at.rial.

Al'e

rad-

This·pasl-

t1011 he naturally holda In "reNnet) to the human mind \11hlch

ho describes .a follows,

nrfow the stuff' of

difterent trom other .tutf .. but not
1s made of the same
f1UlmG

.o~t
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0\11"

brains 1.

very dlt'terent.

It

•

of atoms Which are subjeot to.. the

1a11. as are found In matter genwall,.. The Ol"*ganlza-

t10n of the .tuft 1s. to be ilJure, markedl,. difterent f'3:tom
Inovsan1c organiz.tions, and

:rrdl~k&dly

thoaeround in'lower forme or 11te.

mare lIltr1cate than

aut avon here the eap

is not too ~••t tar .volution or descent to ~ldg•• "~
F01" Montague evolution is the an8'Wer to the oomplex1ty ot

~

,8. .

. 8.3Wl111am p. MontQftU8,
l;each, 'P.

!h!. Ghances st.. SU!'vlvln6

84v,111l1am p. Montague, Belief Unbound, p. 75.

the bra1n structupe and the oomplextt,. of the bPaln stpucture is the ·anewer to the phenomenon of oonsciousness. There
11 no need to appeal bo the Ip1Pltual whell the answer to the
intellectual capacit,. ot an. caD be explained by at deep$!'
appl'eoiation ot the capaoity of the power ot matber.

Mon-

tague oontinues ttlt ••nti.Me 1s 'basel on mattel' it can
not be ba.ed -..1,. upon aome special .distributlon ot lta
partIcle., 1t must 1"athep be lutrina!o to mate%'lal being

a. 8uch. Onoe th18 panpaJ'Oh1.' postulate 18 accepted, then
indeed _ can 91th comp..ative eaa. go on to'impute and ap-

pOfttlon d1ltenno.. of the ••ntlent .,..teme to the 41fterenoe. of theUr phy810al cppnlaatlon."as This unclentanllns

ot matt.r •• being ••sentia111 ••ntlent

Qp

•

oontalnlng ltt•

.

at l ••• t 1s potentialit,. 1a h18 explanatlon at the presenoe

ot ltr. 1n matter
Montague

expl" •••••

~

mope oOP.reotly 1n pbJ$lcal org.ni....

thl. con.optlon ot the phJ.,loal unlveps.

in the following l18DneJllt when he ••,.. that I

"Every exlstent

thing poss..... two kinde 01' being, taotual rand "potentlal t •
Its aotual being 1. what it overtly 1. at

~n7

g1ven plaae 1n

any g1ven instant •••• !t. potential being 1s private

ott

in- .

8S
ternal, an4 not oapable of appearing .xte~nal11.DD6 This
hidden

O~

prIvate aspeot

or

being, thl. unmeasurable part

01 matter 18 the important element 1n e.olution.

espeolall,. tl'Ue 1n the oa.. ot man.

This ls

Fat" "In the lonS

OO't.trS9

of ••olutton tbere oame a time when th1s .eoondary _ystem ot

potentialities pertaining to the 'special 11te ot the braIn
attained suftlcient su-ength to

dependence, and not _1'81" as

tunet~on

an

with a oeM.in In-

Ift8tl'Ullleot to the aeuOl7

and motor ezt.senolea ot the b04111 situation.

It._ tben

that the animal beoa. an•• 87

ot

'I'h1. explanation and tmde:r>etanding or the nature

man has • pztotound etlect on Montague'. explanation of tile

knowledge

pPOC•••

anti ot h1. enth-e eplatemolo3Y_ 'The• 1fOl'd

matter 18 :real11 tbe moet lapOPtant wcrk 1n Montague"
1080Ph1'. lor all

%'• •11t7

pIll't.

phl-

Inolud1ng the lmoww.objeot pel&.-

tlon 1s e%plained 1n tcn.-ms ot It.
the

•

It • • •

However perlabable

of the wd.ver.$ _y be, the whole ltaelt 18 en:-

du:r-ins, and nothing happens without leaving 1ta traoe, While
as

tOJ!!

the unit7 ot the

00_08,

It WQuld

8eem

that the

V6t"3'
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fact that 1t 18 selt-contained with nothing beyond Into
whioh It can .oettel', would oonter upon It a higher degree
of' ox-ganlclt,. than would be possible to'lJ an,. aystem included
within It. n88 It the parts or thl. Whole have unIty and
wganlzatlon why should not the whole?

\;'ould not th& very

wganlzatlon ot the paris alone c·onre;:' a certain unity to
the \'\!hole'

An arrhtmatl".. ana'ftr to t,MS. que.tiona 11 the

oonclusion that !lent.sue tlnaliy

PCUlOMa

tion ot the nattr9 or the un!".P...

He

the unlve,.•• mlght be an arlS.mal ot some

in his considera-

.ven .suggeats that

.CPt,

believing

that just aa we have oonsclous 1Ue, thl. aupeJ'-wganlsm
or 8upel'Wan1mal of' the universe may well a180 have conaeloua

•

11fe and that pephape 1n a flU" hlghet'J degPee than ours.1vee,
and thus is

Goa.

..

Bowe",ep, he does not hold to a pantheism

ot the type 1n which the papta arte merged 1n the whole.
He malntain.8pathel' that the ,a:-t8 retain thaiJ.'l individual-

ity even though they help to

~onatitute

the \\bole.

!.lionta-

gue express.s this concept of the universe .a tollow••

God ••• 1s a selt struggling to inform and assimilate
the recaloltrant thoughts ot hi. own intelleot. For
ea.,.h OPganic membep OP each cQnatltntent thought

.,
a81b1d . , p.:...

0 ......,
U4
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has a being and lite ot its own, lIke that 01' the
whole of Which It is a p.~t. The purpose and value
sought bJ the Great LIte is the lame as that ot the
lesle~ lives withinJ no fixed teloa ar end, but a
maximum inorease of 11fe itaelF••• ,Fot" m;cr 8S fo1"
us all, goods are ~elative, variable, and growing,
New va~uea 8r$ generated by old. and new summits ot
beauty are revealed from the summi ta already asoended.tJ9
ThIs 1s the God of Montague.

He·l8 the potentiality

den ene:rgy of the ph7lieal ul'l1vera.

~

o~

hid-

it mIght be better

to dosoribe him as tbe ph1alcal universe consIdered trom
the pOint ot vIew ot ita potential onergy. Thl. God le.
finite oonaoiouane •• stpIvlng to oompletel" . .allae himae1t.
tike us he 1. strussling to attain hi. fullnesl through tbe

prOoes. of' evolution., which 11 giving him more ot h1. po"•

f'eotion wlth the paa.age of' time.

• he
What he wl11 be "when

•

1e tully aotual1a.d neither he nop we know at the present
stage of this proces..

He 18 a8 _terial as and

~s

part of' the url1ve!"se .s we aPe, 1t he exists at all.
i8 Montague"

oonoeptlon

or

muoh a
Suoh

God.

!;fontasue did not pUl'poeel,. Mt out to make 1nnovatloms
in the "1"1<1 ot philosophy., but rather tried to make use
new 8!"gumenta to solve the
•

t~adlt lonal

or

problema ot philosoph,._
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The results, however, werG uaually untraditional solutions

to the problema of philosophy.

In t."le field ot ep1stemol-

ogy in particular Montague tried to find a

eOl'llmOD

bas1s ot

reconoi11ation tor the oommon contemporary philosophical

solutions_ and be felt that he had done so by the proper
comb1nation 01" the three methods 'or objectIvism, dualism,
and subjeotivism 1n his own approaoh

~o

the problem.

I!e

considered Indeed that his solution met all the objections

raised against it and was in acoordance with experienoe.

It 1s easy to see that the 1dfja of the nature of co08010\18-

ness that he proposed underlies his solution to the epistemological problem, and stands by itself

£18

a bold attempt

•

to save the spiritual nature or the soul in terms accevt-

able to modern materialism.
We

have considered Montaguets Interpt'"'etation

of

ob-

jectivisl"l1, dualism, and subjectivisM and his ohoice of
what he considered the elements' of truth in them as the
toundation

ot his own epistemological system,

~loh

he

considered to be a reconciliation of these ,three mutually
opposed systems.

We

have seen also that the basis

or

h1s

epistemological system 1s h1a understanding of the nature
and tunetlon

ot oonaeiottaMtUt. \Vlth an undel"tandlne ot

these point. of his philosophy in mind, we will in the

next chapter t%'y to elva

B

orlticlsIn and evaluation of

these points of Montaguets phl1oeopby.

..

CP'.APTER III
A CRITICISM AND EVA LUAT IOU OF

V!ILLIA!,~

PEPPERELL

MONTAGUE IS EPISTE1\70LOGY AND THEORY OF
conSCIOUSNESS

Positive

The

Cont~ibutiont

Montague like all

~he

Ret~n

realists,

to Reality

atte~pted

to base and

construct his theory of ltnowledge on the data of experience.
His pur-pose was to save the external world as an independent
reality and as the true cause of our sensations.

In this en-

I,

deavour he opposed the objectivist notion that every object
of experience is a real Object.

This position made the ob-

jectivists give to the objeots of error and

illusi~n ~8

••

much

reality as they gave to the ordinary Objects of perception.
Their conclusIon Montague rigp.tly could not accept as reasonable, because it would give an objective and real existence
to the illusions and fantasies of the mind that most people
understand to be purely subjeotive.

He insIsted repeatedly

and oorreotly that this explanation of error was the weak
point of Objectivism. 90

90
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As regards Montague's explanation of the origin and
nature ot error we can agree with him that it involves two
basic tactors, the object and the knower.

By the object he

meant the external reality and its causal influence on us,
and these two constituted what Montague called the "existence
system" ot reality.

On the other hand

thai%' p%'oper oapacitY' to %'eoeive

ener~

o~

sense organs and

from the object he

called the ·exp~ri.acel,.stem"· of r.ality~91

The only sub-

jective taotCXt- that Montague allowed was the condition ot
. the sense organs

OX'

the oondition of the 8th'r me apace be..

t •• en the knower and the object.
The meeting point of the existence system and the ek-

•

perience system, according to Montague, was in the 'act of

.

knowing some objectJ and Montague added it was also the
point where the possibilitY' ot e%'ror and illusion arose.
The physical energy

tpOM

the perceived object can be d1s-

tOJ"ted by a detect in the operati on of the senses, or by
some change in the medium

OX'

space between the object and

tact~

would give rIse.to a falee per.

ception OJ" error of sense.

An erroneous judgment baaed on

the senses.

Either

•

91 ibid ., pp. 306-309.
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this defeotive sense peroeption would give rise to intellectual el"l"ora.
Weaknesses:

Difficulties in His 'ltReturn to Reality'lt
Latent Idealism

Actually Montague insiats more on the role played by
subjective taotars than merely the
senses ar the environment.

di~tortion

caused by the

Hls tinal solution to the episte-

mological problem is based on a principle ot procedure which
he calls seleotivity.

This principle of reliltive selectivity

means that our consciousness ot objeots at any given moment
depends more on our mental activity than it does on the
ternal objects themselves.

•

ex-

The reason·· tor this is' the.. nature

of the mind itself as understood by Montague as a system ot
potential energies.
The psychophysioal theory that the mind 1s a system ot
potential energies enable~ us to understand haw and why
its objeots are other than ttself. For potential energy
has a double, selt-transcending reterence. As the determiner of future mottons, it is an agent and faces future ....
ward; but as the "determinee" ot past motions, it taoes
pastward and is a patient. It is the,retrospeotive reference of potentialities to their causes that constitutes the curious cognitive function. \"fe live forward,
but we experienoe backward •••• This explains the curious
relativity of objeot. known to the subjects that know
them, a relativity that is ·selective R but never oonstitutive •••• ~bich thina. we shall know at any moment de-

93

pends on OUI' internal states at that moment, but the
things thus known are independent both in §ssence and
existenoe of the states that reveal them.9 2
The mind determines at least to some extent which objeots in
the environment it will turn its attention to and oonsider
trom the various objeots that are physically present to it.
The problem that immedIately arises tn this situation is:
'~at

is the criterion or standard by which the prinoiple ot

selectivity can be extended ol"restricted in its applioation
to objeots'
A

Begging ot the Question

If the application or the degree of applioation ot the

•
prinoiple of selectIvity to objects depends upon, the judg-

..

ment ot the knower alone then it can hardly be used as the
founding principle ot an Objeotive phIlosophy ot reality.
Montague himself used this prino1ple to reduce objeotivism
and dualism to forms to subjectivism..93 Howevell' he considered subjectivism as an over extension ot this principle and
proposed his own philosophical solution to the problem ot

9 2wl111am P. Montague •

9~11111am p,

.!.h!. wals 2!. Things, p. 672.
Montague, !h! Ways ~ Knowins. pp. 26$-268.
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knowledge by a mare moderate use of it.
Yet even such a "moderate use" is a fundamental weaknesa in Montague's epistemology; and he oan hardly say that
the data of reality determines the extent of the application

ot the principle of relative selectivity, because it is to
the data of reality that the prinoiple 1s applied.
ject that is measured and judged by

t~is

The ob-

principle cannot at

the same time be the measure of the applioation of this principle.

Therefore, the only alternative is for the knower to

determine the extent of the application of tbe principle himself and thus the norm to measure reality becomes a

subjec~·

tive norm--the very situation that Montague wanted to aVPld. 94

• the
Montague, as we have seen, identified the real and

.

true as words meaning the same thing.

-

Then he considered the

three definitions given for the true by the objectivists, the
dualists, and the subjectivists.

'rhe solution that he pro-

posed was an attempt to reconoile the three systems, based on
a reconoiliation ot the three definitions of the true.
the fundamental problem that remained was: does the mind
really know the objeot?

94~.,

pp. 237-2)8.

But

Subjective Implications
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'"

According to Montague the senses do not intuit the
object in the act of perception. but only receive physical
energy from the object according to their capacity.

In

other words the act of perception or cognition is completely
physical or material.

Moreover he

d~rined

a physIcal entity

as something that exists in the spatio-temporal universe.
This being the ease, one asks ,"where does the known object
exist?"

If it exists in the brain of the knower, then we

have two entities, the real object that exists outside the
mind, and the mental object that exists physically inside
the material brain.

In. this situation the knower does not
,
perceive the extra-mental object as such or direct~y,.but

what is directly known 1s the object in the brain.

T~is

means that we do not have a true knowledge of extra-mental
reality, and the way 1s open to complete scepticism, because
Montague does not hold to any intentional nature far the mental speoies of the external object.

Indeed, he cannot hold

to the intentional nature of knowledge because his conception
of knowledge 1s completely physical and material.
1s only tmplleatory of reallty.95

95~.,

r!
p. )O;;H

Knowledge

By the intentionalityot knowledge 1s meant the nonphysioalunion between the knower and the thing known by
which the object is made present to the knower.

This unIol);t''''''' .

is impossIble on the physioal or material level-the level
to Which Montague clung so tenaciously, and oonsequently the
notion of the intentIonality of knowledge is entirely absent
tram his epistemology.
Redoes not completely solve his problem when he insists
that ph'1Sical energy trom the object causes the sensation of
the object in the knower, because physical .nergy from the
object 1s not the object.

Aotually 1n thIs case all that we

would know is the physical energy from the objeot and ndt the
object itselt.

Henoe a truly realistio explanatIon ot• know-

..

ledge 1s impossible for Montague.
The gratuitous assumption on the part of Montague that
the potential energy ot matter is equivalent to sensation
will not solve his basie y;roblem.

that

"p~tential

For despite his insistenoe

energy" or the latent energy in objects is an

acourate guide to our knowledge of things as they are, no
proof 1s ever given in support of it.

If for the sake of argument, we accept Montague's prem1se that potential

ene~gy

viewed from inside the knower is
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the actual knowing of the object by the kno'\16r, the epistemological

~~oblem

still remains unsolved.

For the potential

energy which he identified with sensation is only the result
of the physical energy that comes to the knower from the object in the aet

or

perception.

implicative of the object.

This energy is at best only

Without

an

intentional union of

knower and object a realistic theory of knowledge is

i~

possible.

Montague himself tmpl1cltly admitted this When he critioized the dualists for holding a representative theory

or

knowledge which made it impossible to know the objeot directly and immediately, while admitting that we could know ~.
sense image of it.

•
The dualists gratuitously presUmed,

..

Montague complains. that the sense-data would be like the
external objects that caused them.

This presumption he

thought was not a good foundation tar knowledge or epistemology.96 Yet he himself presumes that the energy from external objects will be a suffioient guarantee of the validity

or

knowledge-a position almost identical with that of the

dualists.

To say that we have a

~eneral

likeness of the external

object is not, however, to say that we know the external object.

Unless there is real identity bo'cween the object and

our knowledge of' the object, we cannot really say that we
know it.

",'e can at best say that we knoVl something simila!'

to the object, but tl'!is is not knowledge in the strict sense
of' the \Vord.
In other words, Montague failed to fulfill the requirement of identity between the object and the
act of the knowing.

kno~er

in the

The validity of knowledge is "ascertain-

ed" simply by repeated experience of the same Object.

This

experience gives us, Montague asserts, a good lmowledge of'
the object, just as even a series of bad photographs ,can
give us a good idea of what they represent, if we compare
the pictures with each other.
pictID~es,

In the case of the distorted

however, we have our eyes that can see the object

and then sort the photograpr.t.S with an experienced mental im...

age in mind.

On the other hand, if our senses give us dis-

torted knowledGe by their very nature the problem is really
quite different, because we have no way of making an objec-

tive comparsion of them., The only source of information of
the outside world that we have is our senses.

If these do
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not give us true knowledge of reality, then realIty remains
for us tareva!' unknowable J Qnd knowledge is a pretension
without a toundation in tact.
Montague was not completely unware ot this'difticulty,
but he did not think that knowledge was made completely unattainable because of tt.97 He realized that the overwhelming majOl"ity of men feel that we, have a true knowledge

of reality, and felt that sueh a univel"Sal conviction could
not be

~ong.

On the other

han~he

did not see how Q oloser

identification between knower and known could be achieved.
His explanation of sensation as "implioatory of reality" was
offered as

til

guarantee of the validity ot our knowledge ",of
•

•

external objects, yet the only genuinely philosophical gusr •

..

antee of true knowledge would include a union or identity
between the content of knowledge ar object known and the external object, and this is absent 1n his system.
The question that naturally COmes to mind at this point
is whether it is possible or not to have a union between the
knower and the thing known?

The answer is. that it is only

impossible; if the mind is a material entity. because matter
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as an object oannot cammunloata itself to matter as a subject.
St. Thomas himself admitted this implicitly \'!hen he wrote aa
follows:

••• the

thing known must needs exist 1n the
not materially but immaterially. The :reason
for th s is that the act of knowledge extends to
things outside the knower; tor we know the things
that are even outsiae us. Now 'by matter the form
of 4 thing is determined to some one thing. Therefore. it 1s clear that knowledge ~s in invorse proportion to mate~la1ity. ~onsequently, things that
are not :reoeptive of forms, save materiality have
no power of knowledge whatever •••• But the more 1m....
materially a being reoeives the form of a thing
known, the more ~rect is its knowledge.9 B
mate~ial

knowe~!

I

It is precisely this materialism in MontaGue's philo-

.

sophy that makes it impossible to have a union between the
knower and the Object known.

Matte~

i8 the prinoiple ~or

limitation in the world; it i8 the indivIduating pr1nd1ple
that limits a particular essence to some particular existent,

and the mare material an object Is the more limited is its
ability to escape its selt-confinement and enter into a cog-

nitive union with other things.

Knowledge, on the other hand,

by its veX'y definition is anidentlfieation of the knower with

the thing known; and consequently the basis of

suc~

a union

must be the immateriality found in the aet of knowing.

98£ •.2 •• II,
.

B4 ,2.
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1s an immaterial act uniting the knower with
the thing Imown •••• That which is kno,.,l'l is not only a
thing existing in and tor itself, but, as known, it is
a thing existing in and for the knower: the knower is
not only what he is in himself, but he is intentionally
the thing known. This act whereby the knower becomes
the known. whereby the knownexlsts for the knower,
is ••• the aet of intentional existing. This act is
knowledge 1tself •••• lntentional existence ma.kes a. thing
be known. Thoroughly relational in character, opposed
to simply being in lts~lf, it is an aot whereby a knower
is the other as other. Y9
~nowledge

If the mind could not

ta~e

the information that the

senses gave it concerning external objects and form a union
with them, it would never really know them.

In knowing the

external object the mind is not physioally but intentionally
united with the Object.
being known.

The object is in no way changeq by

.

The object retains its physical exlstenae in

the external world, but also now begins to exist in

way in the mind of the knower.

a~ew

The object must exist in

some VUfJ.y in the mind of the knowor In order to be tl'uly known.
The objeot cannot exist in a physical way in the mind for
that would really posit two physioal objects: one in the
mind and another outside the mind.

Moreover if only some

ef'fect of the object existed in the mind, then the mind
would only know the effect of the objeot and not the objeot

99Frederick D. WIlhelmsen, Man's Knowledse ~ Realltl,

60.
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itselt.

The objeot must exist then 1n a non-material or in-

tentional way in the mind ot the knower.

This intentional

mode ot existence is oompletely relational in oharaoter, far
the thing known is not the mental existent, but the external
physically existing oQject.
Disguised Materialism
There 18 no radioal or e8sential distinotIon between
the operations ot the .ense8 and the operat1on of the intellect in Kontague's phlloaoph1.

According to Montague the

potential energy of matte. is senaation.
nature is full ot 11te and sensibility.

Matter by Its very
All the

de~~ea'

•

of

intelligenoe in animals and men can be explained in tv_ ot
matter and ita powers and abilities.

We know trom experienoe,

however, that there are two diatinct aspects to our knowledge
of objects.

We know objects both as partioulars and aa be-

longing to a olass.
In the aot ot sen.ation, Montague points out, we knqw
the object directly in all its concretenes..

We know it not

only in ita primary qualities, but in all those characteristios which it possess 1n the real world.

A1thourp these

objects are concrete and singular, the ooncepts that we form
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ot them aX'e universal, and bY' means ot these ooncepts we a:re
able to group external objeots into Val"iOUB oategwies and
01a8ses,

These oateg01"ies and classea, howevel", do not exist

as suoh in the external wo:rld,
The mind,

8S

experienee shows, is able to grasp ce:rtain

chal"aotel"istica at objects and cOnsideX' them apart trom the
objeots in which theY' 1nhe!'..

These ,chal'acteriatloa t though

theY' al"e considered without the object, actually al"e found
in the object.

In other yOX'ds though the mind. can considep

the object undel" • univel"sal aspeot, it kno.s that the object exists as a single, definite, concrete thing.

Montague

himsel! recognizes that this 18 part of the process of
ing the object.
idea

8S

•

•

RnOW-

He expresses his notion of the universal
.

tol10'U I

Expe:r1ence 18 indeed originallro! pa:rticula:rs, that is,
of objects that are presented at particular times and
places. But each ot these experienced objects has.
univeI'sal nat~e which is as indefeasiblY' its inclusive
propex-tr 8S is ita un1que position in space and lIme
its exclusive Pl"opel"ty. In other words, the given
elemen£s or experience are complexes ot unive78ala, each
complex being assooiated with a partioular position 1n
the space and time aer1e •• It 18 thI.·1atter factor of
pOSition which constitutes particularity and makes eaoh
indif1dual numerically ditrel"ent trom every other 1ndivldual •••• ln short, a Earticular is nothins but Ii com~.~unrvel'.als endowed witn !,poaItIon in 8Ei'ae-ind
l°Owill1am p. Montague,

!h! Wals .2! Knowins, pp. 77-78.

1<4
The particular difficulty with this notion of the nature
of' the universal 1s that instead of the universal being based
o~

the individual, the individual is based on the universal;

for Montague, while admitting" that we have experience of particular objects, regards their nature as universal, becaus.
every particular individual has the
nition 01' the univel'sal seems to

same

depr~ve

nature.

This defi-

the individual ob-

jeot of' its particular concrete nature, for the nature of a
thing is not something that exists apart from the partioular
objeot that possesses it.

The nature at the universal is

based on the particular and not that of the particular on the
univel'sal.
•

f

The mental process by whioh the mind considers e\ements
of likeness and unlikeness in particulars and hence forms universal concepts concerning things is called the process ot abstraction.

The toundation or basis for abstraction is round

in the external object.

If the foundation tor the universal

did not exist in the particular the mind would be deoeiving
us in the prooess of abstraction.

Abstraction oan be defined

as the mental representation of one or several elements of a
thing, the other elements in it not being represented.
St. Thomas says that there a%"e two kinds of abstraetion that
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the mind can apply

to.mate~lal

things.

He describes this

twofold process as followsl
may ocour in two ways. FIrst, ,by way of
composition and division, and thus we may understand
that one thing does not exist in some othe~J o.r that
it is separate f~om it. Secondly, by way of a Simple
and absolute consideration; and thus we may unde~8tand
-one thing without conslde~in~_ another •••• For it is
Q.uite true that the mode of unae~standing, 1n one who
understands is not the same as the mode of a thing
In being; alnee the thing undera,tood 1s immateriall,.
in the one who understands, according to the mode of
the intelleot, and not matQrlally, according to the
mode of a material thing.10~
Abst~actlon

The mind does not falsity nature by

th~s

process of

abstraction, but onl,. considers thIs or that particular aspect of the object as it applies to all sImilar objects.or
,
compares objects of different classes to see points of similarity or dissimilarity_

of

This mental process does not affect

the material object because of the immaterial mode or manner
in whlch the object exists in the mind of the knower; and the
process' of abstraction is quite valid because the mind does
directly know the concrete object through the senses and is
well aware of the true nature of the object existing in the
external

world~

----.

101e G

The foundation for abstraction, however. is
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found 1n

ext~a-mental

tures are shared

by

reality. because the same concrete na-

many particular things.

However thIs complicated process of abstraction is certainly radIcally different

senses.

~om

the operations ot any of the

No matter how complex the sensory prooesses are in

man they can not explain the formation of universal ideas.
The universal 1de. is not seeo .a suoJ;1 by the senses, but 1s
disoovered by the thinking mind b7 considering the data ot
reality.
The Basic FaIlure

~t

Montague's

Theory Of Consciousness
•

•

The oorner-.tone, however, or Montaguets epistemology
.

was his theory ot the nature or consciousness and the phys ioal universe.

Montague put consciousness and the material

world on the same level as parts or the material universe.
Consciousness was considered as a l"'elation of awareness between the knower and the object, with the object exercising
physioal influenoe on the knower.

Knowledge was oonsidered

as physioal and material aa the known object.
the questiont
exist?

'fhe~e

This brings up

1n the physical universe does knowledge

Montague would say in the hidden or potential energy
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of matter.

When physioal energy from an objeot reaches the

brain it passes into "potential energy", the equivalent to
sensation a.r knowledge.
Montague dId not pJ:'ove that the potential energy of
matter was sensation.

He merely asserted it as a possible

explanation 1n materialistic terms of the nature of the mind
or soul, and indeed of the entire

phy~ical

universe.

Apart

from the fact that whatever 18 gratuitously asserted can be
gratuitously denied, let us consider if matter haa the quality of natural vitality that Montague ascri't>ed to it.

If we

examine the physical universe and the living organisms in it,
we find one universal fact that applies to each and
of them.

That fact is that allot them die.

•

eve~

one

•

No person can

.

deny the universal tact of physical death among all living
o.rganisms.

To say, as Montague d1d, that death 1. merely the

ohang1ng of one t.erm of lite for another is an impossible assumption on the purely physical level.

Though the death of

an animal may give rise to some lower forms of life, this can
hardly be said to be a continuation of the, life of the animal.
There 18 no quantItative difference between a dead and a live
organism, but there is a real and radical difference between
them.

Experience proves that matter is not vital by reason
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of its own pvoper nature, because there is no material or

quantitative diftel"ence between .. living and a dead organism.

"An organism is a unity, a substance determined in it-

self, not a oolony of cells or atoms •••• It is the

!2!:!

or

soul ••••hieh explains the unity of thecampositum. the unity
of the living thing, the proper eharacter of organic develop-

ment, of growth and proteetion. ,,102
Montague claims, however, that the nature ot knowledge
and of oonsoiousness is material.

FO%" him the only existent

reality 1. the material un1Terae.

This means that operations

that we would ordinarily coneide%' epil"itual or the result ot
spiritual power are due to the potential energy of ma~ter •
. •
AlthougS it set forth to save the reality and validitt of
knowledge, this view oonta1ns the seeds of its own destl'uetion,
because it makes impossible any satisfactory union between
the mind and its object.

No proof can be given that the phy·

sical eftects of the objeot in the brain are identical with
the object.

Montague himself admits that they are only "tm-

plicative", and this 1s not sufficient top, knowledge.

The

bas1a failure in Montaguets system of philosophy, as we have

l02A•D• Sert1llanges, Foundations of Thomistio Ph1losophy,
pp. 196-197.
.' - -
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indioated, i. his radical materialism.

The mind or soul is

looked upon as a part of the physioal universe.

It is oon-

sidered as material as any other part of the physical universe.

In fact the soul is reduced to,. system of energies

that porvade the brain-energies which, Montague asserts,
when viewed from the outside are' R potentia1 energies·, but
viewed from the inSide are "the actuality of sensation R •
8This is auch stuff as souls ~re made on."1 03 Can such a
soul be considered 8S capable

ot;~ortality?

Montague hopes

that it can, but ia not sure.
Montague's Contribution to American

Philosoph~
r

The influence of Montague upon Amerioan

.

philosop~y

can

be measured to some e3tent by the tact that the October 13,

1954 issue

01' the

Journal

~

Philoaophl was dedicated to him.

The tribute there given. to him indicates that he made a last ..
ing impression on those who knew and were associated with him
both as a man as well as a philosopher.

As regards his oon-

tribution to the field or American philosophy, he oertainly
made derinite contributions to the naturalistic trend in

103wil11am p. Montague,

!h!. wals 2! 'l'h1n Ss,

p. 41$.
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American thought and to the neo-realist movement.

His oon-

oeption of the knower-object relation was one ot the distinctive features of the neG-realist movement.l~

It enabled

the nee-realists to give a far More satisfactory explanation
of error and illusion than they had previously offered. ,The
neo-realists, however, were never able to give a oompletely
satisfactot'y explanation

or

the orig~n

and cause of error

and IllUSion in sense pepeeption.
Montaguets theory ot oonsoiousness as a relation between
objeots rather than aa a substance enabled him to emphasize
the Independenoe ot external object. as far as any dependence

.

on the mind 18 conoepned, and allo clarified the need, tor the
.
secondary qualities ot objects to have a8 muoh of an fbjective
existence 1n the world as the primary qualities of objects.

Far, according to Montague, oonsciousness was in no sense a
creator of reality, but only served the function or making us
aware ot what already existed 1n the object.
On the other band hIs prIncIple of relatIve seleotIvlty

emphasized the role of the individual
objects to be known.

know~r

In choosing the

This prinoiple is of oardinal importance

1~Wll1iam P. Montague, "Current MIsconoeptions of

RealIsm",

I!

(February 19 07], PP. 101-105.
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in Montague's philosophy Inhi8 explanation of the aoquisition of knowledge and the genesis of error.
ception of the role

or

Indeed his con-

the principle of selectivity in

aoquiring knowledge seemed to make consciousness more than
a mere relation between objeots, although Montague denied

this.
Another distinctlve feature of
was his theory of "bylopsychismft •

~ont.guet8

philosophy

Aocording to this the~

sensation, intrinsio to material realIty, was expressed externally to • glven object as the potential/energy of that
objeot.
view.

All reallty can be considezted :f'rom two pOints of

i?Vhat

is viewed as the potential energy of an

from. the point ot vie" of the external observer is

o~j.ct

•

ex~res8ed

as sensation within the object itself.
In the realm of 1"ellg10n Montague held to a conception
of God that made Rim a part ot the material universe.

Indeed

he was inolined to look upon the entire physical universe as
some

supe~

organism.

This .upe%" organism had a consciousness

of things, and this conacioU$ness was God.. Be felt that this
was the only way to,keep God as part of

~eallt1,

and the ne-

cessary finiteness of such a God made it easy for Montague to
solve the problem of evil in the world.

Such, indeed,. were
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the contributions of Montague to the .field of" American
philosophy,

Most of these philosophic positions were not

original with him, but he did contribute to their developmont on the American soene.
All ot

l~iontague

's oontributions to American thought

were.not of equal importanoe, nor
as the best solution to the
applied them_

do we

partioul~

have to accept them
problems to Whiah he

His explanation of consoiousness 1s at best

only a refined materia11sm.

Ris oonclusions,

thoref~e,

as

to the immortality ot the soul was on his own adMission a
sinoere hope and wish.

Logically his hope was vain tor no

real proof was offered by him for the immortality of the
physical material soul.

•

'Montague's theorIes on epistemology do not give :n.tffIalent attention to the intelleotual operations of the mind.
He did not make a rad1cal distinction between the operations
of the senses and the intelleot, but tried to explain the entire prooess of knowledge in materialistic terms.

Finally.

because he cannot adequate the objeot and t he mind 1n this
materialistic conception of knowledge, the only conclusion
that can be drawn is that he failed to solve the epistemological problem.

Without the intentional identity between the

113
mind and the objeot, there oan be no rea1istio theory of
knowledge, and there 1s no adequate theory of intentionality
in Montague's writings.
Montague's theories On epistemology and the nature of
oonsoiousness do not fit all the facta of experienoe.

More.

over, his explanation of these realities though ingenious
was not baaed on oorreot first prinoiples of being, and henee
was doomed to failure tJ:tom the beginning.

These in brief' are

the pz-inoipal objections that oan be brought against Montaguets
philosophical positions.
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